ONE CONFERENCE

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

December 2019

Researchers have often focused on either the humanitarian crisis or the Third Indochina war. Most studies treat the other crisis as a background plot in their main narrative. Refugee specialists have studied legal aspects, social consequences, or human experiences. They only point at Cold War tensions and their influence in refugee protection.1 Scholars of the Third Indochina war paid attention to the armed fight or high politics. They mention the flight of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam as an important contention bones between Hanoi and Beijing.2 Yet there has not been to date any analysis of these two parallel developments. What is the link between the two crises? How do they influence one another? A study of the UN and UNHCR archives shows us that the response to the humanitarian crisis served political objectives. This essay summarizes a more detailed article published in the Journal of X. studies. The full article is available here and here.

China’s Diplomatic Initiative

The humanitarian crisis and political crisis required different solutions and separate approaches. Yet this changed when China realized that its invasion of northern Vietnam did not bring any results. The military campaign had failed. Perhaps, a diplomatic offensive could prove more successful.3

The United Nations was the scene where international politics and humanitarian concerns combined. Communist states often viewed United Nations agencies with suspicion because of their potential interference in domestic affairs.4 Now the same agencies could help China isolate Vietnam. Although Beijing had taken over the seat of the Republic of China in 1971,5 it did not take part in all UN agencies with the same zeal. Beijing was particularly active in the Economic and Social Council. But it was largely absent in many other agencies. But in June 1979, China sent a delegation to the UNHCR Executive Committee meetings. The Southeast Asian refugee crisis could put Vietnam under intense scrutiny.
 

China also relied on the influence of the UN Secretary-General. On March 16, China completely withdrew its troops from northern Vietnam. The UN Security Council failed to vote a resolution condemning Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia because of a Soviet Veto.6 On the same day, the Chinese permanent representative at the United Nations met with the Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and asked him to do everything he could to end Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. This is when the political crisis also became a problem for the United Nations as well.

The UN Secretary General had already built a good relationship with China. Kurt Waldheim and his wife had visited the country in 1972, shortly after China’s admission as a member of the United Nations. 

The UN Security Council fails to pass a resolution condemning Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, 16 March 1979,
Credits: UN Photos
Ambassador Huang Hua, Permanent Representative of China
Credits: UN Photos
Waldheim was the first Secretary-General to visit China after its entry as a member of the United Nations in 1972.
During his visit in 1972, Kurt Waldheim met with Chou Enlai
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UN’s Initiatives to Solve the Crises

Kurt Waldheim took Chinese demands seriously. In late April 1979, the Secretary General travelled to Asia. He visited Vietnam and China, in the hope he could offer his good offices. But none of them agreed to change their position.7
The Secretary-General also stopped over in various Southeast Asian countries. He had to convince Malaysia and Thailand to accept refugees and boats in distress. But he did not achieve better results on the humanitarian crisis either. Thailand, whose government had previously provided shelter to refugees from Vietnam and Cambodia, was returning to the border any population arriving after January 8, 1979, when a new government, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea took over from the Khmer Rouge. According to Thai authorities, any person arriving after that date was a communist partisan or sympathizer. They were illegal on Thai soil and could not be considered as a victim of Communist persecution.8

Kurt Waldheim returned to New York with no results.9 On May 24, he appealed countries to increase their financial contributions and resettlement quotas to ease the burden on first asylum countries.10 It was the response to this call which proposed to deal with treat both crises as one. 

The Political Use of Humanitarian Response

The United Kingdom replied to this call with a proposal.11 It requested the organization of a conference. The meeting would deal with the humanitarian crisis and condemn Vietnam as the main source of persecution. Both the Secretary General and the UNHCR expressed reservations and consulted other countries.12 Although countries did not agree on all aspects of these questions, they recognized the emergency of the situation and agreed to come. A conference was possible because there was a formidable convergence of interests.
China wanted to use the Indochinese refugee crisis as a way to single out Vietnam as the main source of political instability in Southeast Asia. The United States supported this initiative, which resembled Washington’s policy since 1975. The UK had a new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who wanted to “pillory” Vietnam. Even European states concerned with the humanitarian crisis, rather than the political one, were ready to compromise. After London carried out a wide campaign towards allied states and the press, a consensus emerged. The number of states willing to make a pledge to resettle refugees reached critical mass. The G7 countries meeting in Tokyo on June 28 issued a special statement. They declared their commitment to the organization of an international conference.13 ASEAN countries meeting at the Bali Summit at the same time, welcomed the G7 countries’ statement. They declared that they too would attend the conference. 14

 

The July 1979 Conference on Indochinese Refugees

Eventually, the Secretary General organized a conference on the Indochinese refugee crisis. Although Waldheim did his best to give the impression that it was a humanitarian conference, he made four choices showing that the meeting would put political pressure on Hanoi. First, the date and venue of the conference, on July 21st in Geneva, reminded a painful anniversary for Vietnam. Second, the number of participants would be large enough to suggest that the entire international community was involved.
Third, the list of participants excluded Vietnam’s allies, except for the USSR. Finally, the line up of states taking the floor during the two-day gathering, reflected the interests of ASEAN states. This suggested that there was a dual purpose to this conference. It responded to the humanitarian crisis. But it also defused – at least partly – the political deadlock in Asia.

WHAT’S NEXT

Continue to the next article

Read the full article on the 1979 Conference published in the Journal of X Studies (open access)

Jump to a list of links and references for further reading

Read related archival documents

References

  1. The most notable exceptions would be Sutter, Valerie O’Connor. The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990. Short articles alluding to it can be found here Keely, Charles. “The International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters.” International Migration Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 303–14. Frost, Frank. “Vietnam, Asean and the Indochinese Refugee Crisis.” Southeast Asian Affairs 7 (1980): 347–67.
  2. Elliott, David W. P., ed. The Third Indochina Conflict  Boulder: Westview Press, 1981, Quinn-Judge, Sophie. “Chronology of the Hoa Refugee Crisis in Vietnam,” In The Third Indochina War, Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979, edited by Odd Arne Westad, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, London: Routlege, 2006, 234–37.
  3. The United States preferred this approach. When Deng Xiaoping visited the United States on January 1979, Carter first resisted China's proposal to invade northern Vietnam. All eight countries Washington had approached to end aid to Vietnam had agreed to do so in retaliation to the occupation of Cambodia. The President declared: "We think isolating them is a better form of punishment," FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XIII China. “Memorandum of Conversation, President Reporting His Conversation With Deng, 30 January 1979.” 771.
  4. See Elie, Jérôme. “The UNHCR and the Cold War: A Documented Reflection on the Un Refugee Agency’s Activities in the Bipolar Context.” The UNHCR and the Global Cold War, 1971–1984 (2007): Accessed 11 December 2019, https://graduateinstitute.ch//sites/default/files/2018-12/UNHCR_and_CW_Work-P.pdf; Gaiduk, Ilya. “The Soviet Union and Unesco During the Cold War”.” Accessed 11 December 2019, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=30447&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
  5. United Nations General Assembly. “Resolution 2758 on the Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, 25 October 1971.” Accessed 11 December 2019, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en.
  6. United Nations Security Council. “Pv of the 2129th Session, March 16 1979.” Accessed 11 December 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.2129(OR).
  7. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/14.“Notes on a Meeting Held During the Secretary-General’s Visit to Beiking, 1 May 1979, Present: The Secretary-General, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC, Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen Ching of the PRC, Two officials of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Rafeeydin Ahmed, Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Gründhel, François Giuliani, 1 May 1979.”
  8. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0990/ 0005/06.“Notes on a meeting held at Government House in Bangkok, Monday 14 May 1979.” See the original document here.
  9. Kurt Wadlheim’s first memoirs underscored his offer to serve as a mediator in the dispute between China and Vietnam. The Challenge of Peace. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980, 128–129. His second memoir emphasized his achievements in the humanitarian crisis and minimized his role in the political crisis, Waldheim, Kurt. In the Eye of the Storm, A Memoir. Bethesda: Adler & Adler, 1986, 150–151.
  10. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. “Secretary General’s Cable Appeal of 24 May 1979 to Heads of Government on Behalf of Indo-Chinese Refugees.” See the original document here.
  11. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. “Letter to Secretary General from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 31 May 1979.”
  12. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. “Memorandum on Mrs. Thatcher’s Letter of 31 May to the Secretary-General, 6 June 1979.” See also UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. “Letter from V. Dayal Executive Assistant to the High Commissioner to Poul Harting High Commissioner to Refugees, 15 June 1979.” See the original document here.
  13. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_b. “Special Statement of the Tokyo Summit on Indochinese Refugees, 28 June 1979.”
  14. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0913/0019/07.“Joint Communiqué, Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 30 June 1979.” See the original document here.