VISIT TO
THAILAND
During his field trip to Asia, Kurt Waldheim also stopped in Thailand. He met with Thai authorities and inquired on the position of Thai authorities with regards to the humanitarian and political crises.
CONFIDENTIAL
Notes on a meeting held at Government House in Bangkok
on Monday, 14 May 1979
PRESENT:
ON BEHALF OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT:
General Kriangsak Chomanan – Prime Minister
Dr. Upadit Pachariyangkun – Foreign Minister
General Lek Kaeomali – Minister of Interior
Mr. Wongse Polnikorn – Deputy Foreign Minister
General Serm na Nakorn – Supreme Commander
Mr. Arun Panupong – Under Secretary of State Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila – Secretary General, National Security Council; Thai Permanent Delegate to the United Nations
M.L. Birabhongse Kasemsri – Director General, Department of International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and other senior officials,
ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
Mr. Kurt Waldheim – Secretary-General
Mr. R. Ahmed – Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General
Mr. J. Maramis – Executive Secretary, ESCAP
Mr. F. Mayrhofer-Grünbühel – Special Assistant to the Secretary-General
Mr. F. Guiliani – Spokesman of the Secretary- General
Mr. L. Goodyear – Regional Representative, UNHCR
1. At the request of the Prime Minister the Secretary-General gave a general review of his visits to other countries in the area. With regard to refugee affairs, he stressed
(a) the willingness expressed by the Prime Minister of Vietnam to fully co-operate with UNHCR and with receiving countries to arrange for the organised and legal departure of anybody so wishing. The Secretary-General mentioned that UNHCR would open an office in Saigon which would assist in the orderly movement directly from Vietnam.
(b) the concept of the transit and processing centre which would be established in Indonesia. In this connexion the Secretary-General stressed that the present thinking of the Indonesian Government was that the centre would not serve newly-arriving refugees but would accommodate probably 10,000 boat cases, who were already in the surrounding countries and who had been already accepted for resettlement, for the time necessary for UNHCR to complete processing and to arrange onward movement.
2. The Secretary-General then went on to express his deep pre-occupation and concern with the new developments in Kampuchea, which had already led to many thousands of people fleeing into Thailand, and which could lead to hardship for hundreds of thousands more, partially owing to the danger of starvation. He expressed his awareness of the heavy burden already being faced by the Thai Government and of the potential problems, with the serious political aspects. He also agreed fully that the burden should be adequately shared by the international community, and would make every effort to mobilise international assistance, particularly for placements overseas. While realising the wider aspects, he wished, however, to talk of the humanitarian aspects of the problem.
3. In his speech at dinner, the Prime Minister had underlined the difference between “refugees” and “displaced persons” and had said that persons arriving since 7 January 1979 had to be regarded as in a different category. For the United Nations, someone who leaves his own country because of fear is regarded as a refugee. A displaced person is someone who is displaced within his own country. The problem of the refugees had to be treated as a humanitarian matter. What can be done for the 4,000 persons he had seen in Wat Ko from where previously, 1,700 had been sent back? He understood that these people had been told by the Khmer Rouge soldiers in the camp that they would be killed if they returned.
4. The Prime Minister had told him that the Thai authorities were not pushing people back but were trying to persuade them to return. For those who wished to return this was fully acceptable. However, for others who wished to stay, they must be so allowed.
5. He understood the legal difficulties. While preferably he would welcome that the problem be solved on a legal basis, in accordance with United Nations declarations and conventions, if this were not possible he would suggest that the problem be attacked in a pragmatic way. For those wishing to return, they might be given food and allowed to return. For the others, let them stay until they can be shipped out to a third country. He was prepared to mobilise the help of all appropriate United Nations agencies – not only UNHCR, but also UNICEF, WFP, etc., as well as the ICRC. The people should remain under the full control of the government. The United Nations would give food and money and make sure that they are taken out of the country, either to final asylum or perhaps to a processing centre. The possibility of food aid had already been discussed with Mr. Saoma. He would also inform Mr. Vogel of the WFP, to assist if the government agreed.
6. The Secretary-General concluded by once again expressing his deep gratitude to the Thai government for their enormous help in the past.
7. General Lek Naeomali, Minister of Interior, responded to the Secretary-General. He pointed out that arrivals up to the end of 1978 were fleeing from communism. Thailand, as an anti-communist country, allowed them to enter and remain. However, those arriving since 1979 are pro-communist and, as such, are illegal immigrants. This was necessary in order for the government to retain a firm control. However, their status was somewhat similar to refugees.
8. The new problem was beyond Thailand’s capability. They needed financial help rather than talk. They needed the money in hand.
9. In broader terms, he was convinced that if there were peace in Cambodia there would not be refugees. Therefore, the first effort should be to make peace in Cambodia. Secondly, the United Nations should expedite third-country resettlement or rather “re-distribute the persons in other countries”. He asked the Secretary-General, “Did you ask Pham Van Dong why they let people go? They have space and need manpower so must have some ulterior motive. You should persuade them to stop allowing people to leave”.
10. The Secretary-General took note of the Minister’s remarks. He stressed that food assistance would be made available upon the request of the government. However, with regard to General Lek’s point regarding stopping departures, according to the Declaration of Human Rights, anyone who wishes to leave should be allowed to do so and should be granted asylum by other countries. He had been asked also in Jakarta. “Did you ask Mr.Pham Van Dong to stop people coming out”, and had replied that he would never do it. It would be against all the principles which, for 35 years, the United Nations had been trying to establish. The people were risking their lives. He realised that these departures might be solving Vietnam’s problem. However, in spite of that, the United Nations must always support the rights of refugees.
11. General Lek stated that the Secretary-General should have told Mr. Pham Van Dong personally, not in his capacity as Secretary-General. In any event, if a diplomat was accused of spying, a country had the right to expel him. These movements could be organised expulsion of minorities similar to actions taken by Germany before the Second World War and there must be some ulterior motive in letting them go. The situation was one of war. The Secretary-General must understand Thailand’s position.
12. The Secretary-General responded that he did indeed understand Thailand’s difficulties. However, the organised movement out of Vietnam was in response to international pressure. He did not believe that all the persons wishing to come out now were spies; nor did he feel that they were all communists. He felt that it was not in Thailand’s best interests to be rigid towards these persons. If they returned to Kampuchea their lives might be in danger. From a humanitarian point of view this was a very serious situation. He felt the problem could be solved on a practical basis.
13. General Lek repeated the Prime Minister’s assertion that the government does not push back by force – they have no guns to do this. They just use persuasion.
14. The Secretary-General responded that there were two differing stories. It was said that the authorities tried to convince them to return, but he had been told – not only in Thailand but before his arrival, that many are escorted back either by Khmer Rouge troops or by Thai soldiers. This gave them no practical choice. He still felt it should be approached as a practical problem.
15. The Prime Minister asked for confirmation that Indonesia would only accept “old” refugees who have already been selected for third countries. He asked, “what about the 150,000 ‘old’ refugees in Thailand?”.
16. The Secretary-General responded that the Indonesian solution was primarily intended for boat-cases in the area. He did not see it as a solution for the refugees in Thailand for which increased opportunities and more rapid processing on the spot was required. He mentioned that in his talks with the United States Ambassador in Bangkok, the Ambassador had informed him of his efforts to persuade the U.S. government to do more and also of the possibility of the U.S. taking greater numbers.
17. The Secretary-General suggested that he could appoint a senior official from his headquarters as a Liaison Officer. This official would be an experienced man but not a UNHCR official, so that the question of the status of the new arrivals would be avoided. He could act as a personal link between the Prime Minister and the Secretary-General, and could co-ordinate assistance from all United Nations agencies and other bodies, such as the ICRC.
18. The Prime Minister’s response was non-committal.1 He said that all armed soldiers must be sealed in the border area and eventually be pushed back. If the civilians were allowed to stay even without publicity, he felt that the whole of South Vietnam would want to come. The problem was so big. More than 50% of the entrants wanted eventually to go back. The matter caused an internal problem for the country which had many poor people. Acceptance would also raise suspicions. If fighting were to break out between Thailand and Laos or Thailand and Cambodia, it would be very bad, and-very difficult to stop. The refugee problem should be solved as soon as possible. He mentioned that contrary to some reports they did allow boat cases to stay.
19. General Lek said that third countries should complete their processing directly and immediately.
20. The Secretary-General stated again that he would ask the Western countries to extend more effective help.
21. The Prime Minister stated that, the “refugee officials” were wonderful people but they were only looking at the problem from one angle, and did not understand the wider implications.
22. The Secretary-General stated that he realised that there were other aspects to the problem. However, he had to express humanitarian concern. He was sure that it would be possible to find a satisfactory solution.
23. The Prime Minister then suggested that
(a) food supplied should be bought in Thailand. This would kill two birds with one stone. (The Secretary- General agreed that this was a possibility.)
(b) the United Nations should create a “No man’s land” within Kampuchea where all the people would be held and fed directly – this was necessary to avoid supporting the war efforts of either side.
24. The Secretary-General mentioned the problem of non-recognition by the United Nations of the Heng Samrin regime. He felt that this was a field where a Liaison Officer could help.
25. The Prime Minister responded that they didn’t want anyone in the field. “Send the supplies to us. We will do it.” The Secretary-General emphasized again, that the Liaison Officer would work directly with the government; and would do nothing against the government’s wishes. He fully understood the problems but felt that such an appointment might meet both aspects – both security and humanitarianism.
26. The Prime Minister responded that, “We will do the best we can. We do not want too many people in the field”.
27. In conclusion, General Lek stated that the Liaison Officer should get the food supplies directly and also transport and deliver them inside Kampuchea, otherwise Thailand will be accused of helping the Pol Pot regime.
28. The Prime Minister closed the meeting by mentioning Thailand’s many other problems which there had not been time to discuss and stated that he would discuss them with the Secretary- General outside the meeting.
N.B. 1) This note was drafted by Mr. Goodyear. Minor changes have been applied.
2) This note only covers the official talks. There was one other meeting on the last evening, at which only the Foreign Minister and Mr. Ahmed participated.
F.M.G.
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UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0990/ 0005/06. Notes on a meeting held at Government House in Bangkok, Monday 14 May 1979.
Go to the scanned copy of the folder, p. 150 of the pdf file.