Margaret Thatcher introduces the Foreign Secretary, Lors Carrington to US President Jimmy Carter, December 1979

MARGARET THATCHER'S PROPOSAL

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

January 2020

The conflict between Vietnam and China was not over. And the refugee crisis had gotten worse by the day. There was no exit in sight. Yet two months later, sixty-five nations met in a major conference on Southeast Asian refugees. Where did that idea come from? 

Nothing in Waldheim’s call was pointing at the organization of a conference. Yet it was in a response to this appeal, that the newly elected Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, came up with a novel idea. The best way to solve the refugee crisis was to convene an international conference.

A Hardliner Leading the United Kingdom

At first, the UK took part in the refugee crisis as a resettlement country. In the December consultations, the British representative considered that war and poverty were the primary reasons the refugee flow. More countries needed to participate in the resettlement efforts. He also acknowledged the need to alleviate poverty in the region. Only this would provide a durable solution to the population outflow.1 Weeks later, London reacted to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The United Kingdom retaliated by suspending all future aid to the country. Yet the general elections on May 3, 1979 introduced a different conclusion. 

Margaret Thatcher, from the Conservative Party, became the new Prime Minister. The Indochina problem was the least of her concerns. Offering more resettlement places in the UK was also out of the question. One of Margaret Thatcher’s priorities was to limit immigration. As the Conservative Party leader, she had already expressed her position in a television interview. The UK was expecting four millions immigrants from the Commonwealth and Pakistan by the end of the century. According to her, this would have disturbing consequences.  “[T]he country may be rather swamped by the people with a different culture.”2 Now that she had become the Prime Minister, the refugee crisis would be no exception to this emerging policy. Thatcher used the same reason to explain why London did not accept more refugees. Between 1975 and May 1979, only 1923 refugees from Indochina had resettled into the UK. This was a small figure in comparison with the hundreds of thousands the United States and France protected over the same period.3 But two millions Asian immigrant had already come to the UK in the previous fifteen years.4 Hence the country could not open its doors to Southeast Asian refugees. 

The reason why it was urgent to shield the UK from possible arrivals, was because boats were heading to Hong Kong. London received updates of British ships in the South China Sea. Some were not sure whether they should rescue refugees. One was trying to stop in the nearest port in Taiwan. But the Republic of China was about to do the same as Indonesia and Malaysia. That Taiwan could take such a measure would have two important consequences. British embarkations would have even fewer ports to land. And all the boats in the area would head to Hong Kong.5 This territory was in a special situation. As long as this territory had not been returned to China, London would be responsible for what happened to these refugees. Thatcher knew that the public opinion would never accept that the UK push back thousands of refugees to the sea, like Malaysia and Indonesia were doing.6 

Shortly after her election, Margaret Thatcher imagined different options for the United Kingdom’s policy towards refugees from Southeast Asia. The country could withdraw from the 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees. It could order all the ships flying the UK flag that they must reach the closest port of landing if they picked up boat people on the high seas. Boats would have to stay there until they would be allowed to disembark this population.7 London would not take this population back to Great Britain. The reluctance to participate in humanitarian relief inspired her response to Kurt Waldheim’s call for contributions.

Proposition to the United Nations Secretary-General

When Kurt Waldheim appealed to countries to increase their contributions and resettlement quotas on May 24, 1979,  Thatcher did not announce more resettlement places or funding. Instead, she opted for a firm response. ASEAN countries were not the only ones having to assume an unfair burden. Hong Kong too was overwhelmed by the number of arrivals. Besides, it did not receive any support from other governments.8 The UK was taking a new role. It was not, like other Western countries, a place for resettlement. In fact, London was also a victim of this crisis because of its sovereignty over Hong Kong. 

The situation arising from Vietnam’s inhumane actions is so grave that I am convinced that a further conference of member states of the United Nations should now be called under the authority of your own high office.

Margaret Thatcher, 31 May 1979 Tweet

Thatcher insisted that the United Nations had to take urgent action. Calling for more resettlement places or financial contributions was pointless. The United Nations had to deal with the root problem. “The situation arising from Vietnam’s inhumane actions is so grave that I am convinced that a further conference of member states of the United Nations should now be called under the authority of your own high office.”9 Without mentioning UK’s existing or future contributions, she insisted that the Secretary General’s appeal should “be translated into action. The special conference will have our full support.”10 

According to the United Kingdom, the solution involved two components. First, new states had to offer resettlement. The United Kingdom’s Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Sir James Murray called the UNHCR to explain further what London was hoping to achieve. A conference would bring more countries in the multilateral response to the crisis. They would offer resettlement places, or at least financial contributions. This way, Latin American states and other countries that lacked the resources, could also resettle refugees. 

Second, an international conference would have to blame the culprit for this crisis. London insisted on that point when explaining to the UN what would be the purpose of the conference. British representatives insisted that Vietnam be present at the meeting. “[I]t is after all the fault of the Vietnamese Government that the international community is faced by the present appalling human problem.”11 The crisis was grave and required swift action. Thatcher did not mince her words either. In a face-to-face meeting with Waldheim, she hammered down this idea. “Vietnam should be pilloried,” she declared.12 Part of this reasoning did not come from London’s concerns for Chinese interests. In fact, the relationships between the United Kingdom and China were not as close as the one the United States had established. Hong Kong would remain a contentious issue between Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping. Yet keeping some distance with Chinese priorities did not mean that London was pleased by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In fact, Singapore proved a key partner to help Thatcher read the geopolitical situation. During his visit of the UK, Lee Kwon Yew warned Thatcher that this situation all came from Moscow’s determination to turn Southeast Asian states against Beijing. For years, Soviet propaganda warned them that their ethnic Chinese communities were dangerous. They could rise to become Beijing’s fifth column. That Vietnam was “exporting” ethnic Chinese to neighbouring countries was just one way to scare them further.13

Reservations from the United Nations General Secretary

In a cable, Kurt Waldheim acknowledged reception of the letter and thanked the Prime Minister for her suggestion, while explaining that any conference would require careful preparations.14 In a phone conversation two days later, Poul Hartling insisted that Waldheim did not rush to make a decision. According to his own experience, combining political issues with humanitarian consideration was a recipe for disaster: “if it were the intention to call a Conference of all Member States, such a Conference would clearly become political in character (…) So, if it were intended to call together only a limited number of governments in order to consider the problem of refugees from Indochina, then it should be remembered that the UNHCR had – as recently as December 1978 – called a Consultation on this subject.”15 The High Commissioner’s comment said it all. While a single conference was good in theory, it was hardly possible in practice to kill two birds with one stone.

if it were the intention to call a Conference of all Member States, such a Conference would clearly become political in character (...) On the other hand, if it were intended to call together only a limited number of governments in order to consider the problem of refugees from Indochina, then it should be remembered that the UNHCR had – as recently as December 1978 – called a Consultation on this subject

Poul Hartling, 6 June 1979 Tweet

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References

  1. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_39d ‘Draft Summary Report, Consultative Meeting With Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, Geneva 11-12 December 1978,’ § 64–68.
  2. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/Granada Transcript. “TV Interview for Granada World in Action, 30 January 1978.”
  3. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/129 f269. “Vietnam: Home Office Letter to No.10 (“refugees From Vietnam”), 29 May 1979.”
  4. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/28. “G7: Tokyo Summit (Session 2), 28 June 1979.”
  5. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/129 f269. “Vietnam: Home Office Letter to No.10 (“refugees From Vietnam”), 29 May 1979.”
  6. To see the cabinet’s anticipation of the growing criticism in the press over London’s lack of commitment to protection the Southeast Asian refugees, see Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/129 f124. “Vietnam: No.10 Record of Telephone Conversations (Mt-Whitelaw, Mt-Carrington), 4 June 1979.”
  7. Taylor, B. (2015). Refugees, Ghost Ships, and Thatcher. Retrieved 16 January 2020, http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/ghostships/.
  8. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. Letter to Secretary General from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 31 May 1978.
  9. Ibid.
  10. Ibid.
  11. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. Text of phone conversation between UK Permanent Representative Sir James Murray and the HiCom, 5 June 1979.
  12. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0990/ 0005/07. “Note on a Meeting With Prime Minister Thatcher, 12 July 1979.”
  13. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/130 f225. “Vietnam: No.10 Record of Conversation (Mt-Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore) [South-East Asia and Vietnamese Refugees], 20 June 1979.”
  14. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. Reply of 4 June by Secretary-General to British Prime Minister.
  15. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. Memorandum on Mrs. Thatcher’s Letter of 31 May to the Secretary-General, 6 June 1979.