THE HAI HONG INCIDENT

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

January 2020

Everyone around the globe knew about the war. No one ignored could ignore the devastation, the authoritarian regimes, or the killings.1 There were millions displaced internally and hundreds of thousands of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, crossing borders to seek shelter. But for months, this humanitarian crisis did not make the news’ front page. It was one humanitarian crisis among many others. When did the Southeast Asian refugee crisis capture the attention of the world again?

The refugee crisis became a burning issue with the fate of the 2500 passengers of the Hai Hong. The story was fresh for two important reasons. This time, refugees faced an unknown threat. They left on overcrowded boats. They faced pirates attacks, dehydration and drowning. But the greatest danger was that neighbouring countries refused to let them land. What they feared the most was that their exile would never end. 

Smuggling People Out of Vietnam

The Hai Hong was a cargo ship purchased by an ethnic Chinese Singaporean. The man had made a fortune in Southern Vietnam in the early 1970s. He created a timber export company, under the name of Vitimex, but left before the fall of Saigon.2 With the Hai Hong, the businessman tried to repeat the success of another cargo freight.  The Southern Cross, a few weeks earlier, had smuggled thousands of people out of Vietnam. The crew paid a bribe to local authorities.[/efn_note]For details of the corruption of local authorities, see Doyle, Edward, Terrence Maitland, and Robert Manning. The Vietnam Experience: 1975-85. The aftermath, Volume 15. Boston: Boston Publishing, 1986, p. 37.[/efn_note] In so doing, the tycoon saved his wife and netted a profit of $500,000 dollars. The boat then reached Indonesia and pretended that it encountered mechanical problems. So the coast guard allowed the boat to disembark the refugees. 

The businessman envisioned the same scenario for another boat. He purchased a ship in Malaysia and named it The Hai Hong. He requested a temporary Panamean flag. It would only serve until the ship reached Hong Kong, where it would be scrapped. In reality, the ship did a detour off the Vietnamese city of Vung Tau to let refugees embark on the ship.3 On October 19, the ship embarked not only the 1,200 passengers who had paid for their trip. It also had to accept another 1,300 people who the Vietnamese Coast Guard forced upon the crew. If not, the Vietnamese authorities would detain the ship captain and his assistants.4 On October 24, the Hai Hong finally departed to reach Hong Kong. Yet a typhoon forced the crew to turn back and head to the South.5 

Stalemate with Indonesian and Malaysian Coast Guards

On November 2, the ship reached Indonesian waters. The following day, the captain requested assistance to the Indonesian coast guards. He explained that the ship was heading towards Hong Kong but experienced problems with the motor when it reached the Paracel Islands. He requested help for the 2000 refugees aboard the ship. Indonesian authorities found the story suspicious. Just weeks before, another ship had made the same claim. They declared that no foreign owned ship could stop or disembark its passengers without good reasons.6 Maritime authorities offered humanitarian relief to its passengers on board and repairs to the boat. But no passengers could disembark. Instead, they would escort the ship to make sure it left Indonesian waters.

It was becoming clear to everyone that human traffickers were behind this. Neighboring countries, such as Australia and Singapore, feared that the ship would head towards their shores. They announced that they, too, refused to let it disembark. So the Hai Hong sailed to the Malacca Straits and flew its former Malaysian pavillon again. Despite that, the Malaysian coast guards did not welcome the boat. They boarded the ships, interviewed its crew, did the same as their Indonesian counterparts. They provided food and urgent relief but refused to let the ship disembark.

This created an unprecedented situation. It was not one but several countries refusing to let a boat, allegedly in distress, land to the closest port of call. This was a daunting prospect. Would other boats facing technical or life-threatening problems be able to land? It also created significant tensions between countries in the area. Hanoi tried hard to establish friendly relationships with its neighbours. But ASEAN states and Australia did not think likewise. To them, Vietnamese authorities were encouraging departure and making money out of it. 

The Proactive Role of the UNHCR

The regional representative of the UNHCR in Malaysia, Rajagopalam Sampatkumar, played a crucial role in the crisis.  He knew that many countries did not recognize victims of human trafficking as genuine refugees. Australia, who was party to the 1951 Convention, was most vocal about it. To Canberra, people leaving the country by paying a smuggling channel making a profit out of it were not refugees.

Despite this, Sampatkumar declared that the passengers must be considered as refugees. Whether first asylum countries did not recognize them as refugees did not matter.7 That they paid for departure did not undermine their vulnerability. They faced life-threatening dangers while leaving their country.8 So they were refugees, and they deserved protection. This decision was crucial. Without this firm stand from the UNHCR, there would be no one defending the refugees. 

Western Interest in the Plight of the Hai Hong

On November 10, many newspapers in the West ran the story of the Hai Hong.9 The affair even made it to the television news reports that evening. The Malaysian coast guards even allowed for the first time two journalists to board the Hai Hong. They reported with details the suffering, filth and despair of the passengers. Refugees were not an abstract reality. The refugee crisis was almost live and in colors, on everyone’s television.10

Once the Hai Hong made it to the front news, private citizens became concerned with the crisis. Among the first people to launch an initiative was a French Maoist couple, Jacques and Claudie Broyelle who had become aware and denounced the excesses of Mao’s revolution the year before.11 They reached out to influential intellectuals and artists in Paris. Yves Montand, Simone Signoret, or Michel Foucault all mobilized for the refugee crisis. One of them, Bernard Kouchner, became particularly involved. The creator of Medecins sans frontières created a project, L’Ile de lumière with the support of these intellectuals. On November 21, they signed an open letter calling everyone to contribute. They urgently needed money, a boat, and a crew to rescue Indochinese refugees.12 Just a few weeks later, L’Ile de lumière, was cruising in the South China Sea. It operated both as a safety boat and a hospital to the refugees.13 Both the press and public opinions now knew the plight of Indochinese refugees. But this did not mean that there was an easy solution to the crisis. 

Some Governments’ Reaction

It did not take long for governments to take on the issue the media and parts of the public opinion cared about. On November 15, a French member of the parliament raised the issue. A French Representative, Joël le Tac, demanded that France rescue them. The reason was simple: “not only because she has the means to do so but also by listening to her heart and to her memory.” 14

Is France ready to welcome them? She has the means to do so, particularly those that her heart and memory command.

Joël Le Tac, 15 November 1978 Tweet

The same day, political representatives in Quebec held a similar debate. Its commission on immigration discussed the possibility of resettling some refugees. The following day the question was brought to the national assembly. A motion to welcome two hundred refugees passed by a unanimous vote.15 The decision to rescue refugee was significant for several reasons. It manifested a firm commitment to defend humanitarian values. But it was also the perfect opportunity to express Quebec’s autonomy. The province had just negotiated the right to make separate immigration arrangements from the federal government. Protecting refugees show Quebec’s original position regarding both immigration and foreign policy.16 With Québec, it was because of humanitarian interests and Quebec’s struggle for autonomy from Canada, that the situation of the Hai Hong progressed. After Quebec’s decision, other provinces made the same arrangements. And Canada, who had started the creation of a Private Sponsorship in 1976, finalized the last details to make it operational for the Southeast Asian refugee crisis.17

Other countries followed France’s and Canada’s initiative. Belgium and Switzerland joined in and pledged to resettle refugees from the Hai Hong. Immigration officers from these countries could not board the ship. They had to conduct interviews aboard a boat of the Malaysian coast guards to select the passengers for resettlement.18 Eventually, all passengers of the Hai Hong were resettled over the next few months. The United States accepted those who were not selected by other countries.

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References

  1. For a demonstration that the United States, for example, knew about the ongoing killings in Cambodia in early 1978, see Clymer, Kenton. “Jimmy Carter, Human Rights, and Cambodia.” Diplomatic History 27, no. 2 (2003): 245–78.In the case of France, the killings were known since 1977 with the publication of Ponchaud, François. Cambodge, année zéro, document. Paris: Julliard, 1977. On the use of refugee testimonies to make the case for denouncing human rights violations in Cambodia, see Madokoro, Laura. ““Nothing to offer in return”: Refugees, human rights, and genocide in Cambodia, 1975–1979.” International Journal 75, no. 2 (2020): 220–36.
  2. I rely on Wain, B. (1981), The Refused, the Agony of the Indochina Refugees, New York: Simon & Schuster, an Australian journalist who made an extensive reporting on the issue.
  3. Ibid., p. 16–17.
  4. Ibid. p. 21.
  5. Ibid. p. 22.
  6. Ibid. p. 24.
  7. Ibid. p. 33.
  8. Ibid., p. 101
  9. Lewino, F., and G. Dos Santos (2012), ‘C’est arrivé aujourd’hui : 10 novembre 1978. Le jour où le cargo “Hai Hong”, rempli de boat people, fait la une des journaux’, Le Point. 10 novembre.
  10. The journalist William Shawcross claimed that Western media became interested in the crisis when the deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir declared in May 1979, that he would pass a bill to shoot newcomers on sight, Shawcross, William. “Refugees and Rhetoric.” Foreign Policy 36 (1979): 3–11. A close examination of the press shows that Western interest into the crisis had already started before and had intensified with the Hai Hong affair.
  11. On Jacques and Claudie Broyelle's initiative in November 1978, see Hourmant, François. Le Désenchantement des clercs, Figures de l’intellectuel dans l’après-Mai 68. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 1997, chapter 5. On their reassessment of the People's Republic of China in 1977, chapter 4.
  12. https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/affaires-sensibles/affaires-sensibles-24-septembre-2015. Again, it is widely believed that the reunion of Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul Startre in June 1979 signaled joint mobilization of French intellectuals for the refugee crisis. But a close examination shows that their mobilization started right after French media picked up on the Hai Hong affair.
  13. https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Grace-a-l-Ile-de-Lumiere-des-milliers-de-Vietnamiens-ont-reconstruit-leur-vie-2013-08-08-996240
  14. “Est-elle prête une fois de plus à répondre à cet appel, à ce SOS de ces malheureux qui, j'en suis convaincu, croient en ce moment en elle ? La France est-elle prête à les accueillir ? Elle en a les moyens, ne serait-ce que ceux que lui imposent les raisons du cœur et de la mémoire” http://archives.assemblee-nationale.fr/6/cri/1978-1979-ordinaire1/057.pdf and https://www.franceinter.fr/emissions/affaires-sensibles/affaires-sensibles-24-septembre-2015
  15. Although many accounts use November 15 as the day of the vote, the transcripts of Quebec’s national assembly tell another story http://www.assnat.qc.ca/fr/travaux-parlementaires/assemblee-nationale/31-3/journal-debats/19781116/121623.html
  16. Molloy, M. J., P. Duchinsky, K. F. Jensen, and R. Shalka (2017), Running on Empty, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 1975–1980, Montreal: McGill University Press, p. 97–98.
  17. Labman, Shauna. “Private Sponsorship: Complementary Or Conflicting Interests?” Refuge 32, no. 2 (2016): 67–80. For Canada’s policy, see Adelman, Howard. Canada and the Indochinese Refugees. Calgary: L.A. Weigl Educational Associates, 1982, Molloy, Michael J., Pere Duchinsky, Kurt F. Jensen, and Robert Shalka. Running on Empty, Canada and the Indochinese Refugees, 1975–1980. Montreal: McGill University Press, 2017, and the Special issue on Southeast Asian refugee in the journal Refugee 32(2) in 2016.
  18. https://www.rts.ch/archives/tv/information/temps-present/6716071-les-refugies-de-la-mer.html