EMERGENCY IN THAILAND

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

January 2020


Both the humanitarian crisis and the political tensions made little progress. The United Kingdom, faced with an imminent catastrophe in Hong Kong, came up with a solution. A conference should blame Vietnam and bring new countries into resettlement efforts. Yet the Secretary-General and the UNHCR were unsure this could work. What convinced them that the time was ripe for a conference?

Neighbouring states not only pushed back refugees. They started expelling the people they had already accepted before. Besides, Thailand faced two major problems: Over 150,000 refugees took shelter there and Thai intelligence feared that Vietnamese troops would cross the border into Thai territory. On the plus side, public opinion had become increasingly concerned by the refugee crisis. But the media’s focus on “boat cases” only brought some aspects of the crisis to the light.  

Expulsions from Thailand

In the Spring of 1979, Malaysia’s provocative declarations sparked an outcry. People could hardly tolerate that the Coast Guard could shoot refugees at sight. That the country could expel refugees was just as unacceptable. But people had not realized that the forceful removal of refugees was already happening in Thailand. This was the country with the greatest number of refugees. And the Third Indochina War was about to spill over into its Eastern provinces. Thailand was in a critical situation. 

Bangkok warned Washington immediately.1 Thailand had already received over 150,000 by October 1978. Because of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, there were now 200,000 of them. Hanoi blamed Bangkok for not remaining neutral. Hence Vietnamese troops could launch limited incursions into Thai soil to harass the Khmer Rouge. That would trigger an armed response which might endanger the entire region. The United States had yet another incentive to find a solution to the crises soon. 

In the meantime, Thailand could not wait any longer. The army started deporting the population back to the border. Kurt Waldheim had posted a special representative on refugee affairs in Bangkok, informing him of this change. Waldheim immediately sent a cable to General Kriangsak. Multiple sources showed that the Thai army was driving newly arrived Khmers back to the border “whether they wish to go or not.”2 Four days later, the Thai Prime Minister responded to the Secretary General.3 The situation was desperate on his side. Since the “invasion of Cambodia by a foreign power,” there were between 80,000 and 100,000 people crossing the border. This added to the 200,000 refugees already in Thailand and made it unbearable.4 It posed a threat to the stability and security of the country for two reasons. Refugees would soon outnumber the local population. And “people whose identities and loyalties are either unclear or questionable” could stir up trouble in the region.5 The government had to respond to criticism within its own parliament and public opinion.6 So, on June 8, 32,000 “illegal immigrants from Kampuchea, mostly Kampuchean of Chinese origin” were deported.7 Bangkok did not consider them to be refugees. In fact, Thailand believed they were illegal immigrants.8

People deported
to the Cambodian border
25000

“Illegal immigrants from Kampuchea, mostly Kampuchean of Chinese origin” according to Prime Minister General Kriangsak, deported on June 8, 1979

Kurt Waldheim’s Attempts to Stop Expulsions

In response, the Secretary-General expressed his concern. “I cannot hide from you my deep sense of dismay over the action which your authorities have decided to take.”9 He also tried to prevent new deportations. Another 40,000 people had to be deported on June 28. But additional incentives could help Bangkok rethink their decision. First, the United Nations could send $500,000 to Thailand. This would cover emergency relief needs. Second, the World Food Program was also ready to buy from Thai stocks if there were some available. Last, there was no other condition attached to this offer.10

The Thai Prime Minister’s answer did not come at all. Instead, Bangkok declared that they would support the United Kingdom’s call to hold a conference.11 Thailand would not accept Waldheim’s offer. Even a generous aid package would not change this position. Only an international conference would be the best forum to reach a global agreement. In the case of Thailand, it is only in November 1979 that the Thai authorities formally declared that it would open its borders. “[P]urely out of humanitarian consideration and compassion, Thailand would give temporary shelter and relief to all suffering Kampuchean civilians fleeing their nation, which is on the verge of extinction, into Thailand.”12 The tone had completely changed. Bangkok recognized that these people were not illegal immigrants or displaced people anymore. They were “suffering Khmers” seeking relief from a threat of extinction.13

Pulau Bidong in the Limelight

The situation could not go on forever. Both the United States and the Secretary-General believed so. At least, there was a positive development. The public opinion in Western countries became increasingly favorable to protecting refugee. Mahathir’s explosive declarations put Malaysia and the boat people crisis on everybody’s map, if it was not already the case. Most media outlets sent news correspondents to the region to cover the story of refugees. Yet the story of people crammed in camps, and the political impasse would only justify a few columns. It would be a humanitarian crisis like any other. The reason why the media focused on Southeast Asia – and not the millions of refugees in Africa the same year – was because it was a new story to tell. 

This time, refugees were stranded on the high seas at the mercy of typhoons and pirate attacks. If they made it to safety, they would stay on overcrowded islands, with no running water or sewage. Newsprint ran special reports on the situation. TV producers could even find ways to innovate. During the Vietnam war, reporters had embarked with troops on the ground. This time, TV crews filmed almost every part of exodus. The rescue at sea, the wait on the island, the health inspection, the interview with the immigration officer. Everyone could witness the plight of the refugees from their home. CBS’s program 60 minutes sent reporters to the island of Pulau Bidong. The crew did not expect that they would have to save people from drowning and carry them back to safety.14 French television dispatched a team to the Ile de Lumière. The boat served as a hospital for the people on Pulau Bidong. It then rescued refugees at sea.15 The fascination with Pulau Bidong continues to this day. A recent feature film in Malaysia retold the story of there refugees, while documentaries follow refugees returning to the island.16

The media focus on refugees at sea distorted the complexity of this human tragedy.17 It minimized the importance of refugees in mainland Southeast Asia. And it nearly ignored the fact that political tensions and an ongoing war played a role in this situation. At least, this accrued media attention raised awareness on this emergency. It also contributed to the campaign London and Washington carried out to convince more states to resettle refugees. 

References

  1. FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XXII Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “Letter From Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak to President Carter, 11 June 1979.” 611–13. They sent a similar account to the United Kingdom three days later, Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/129 f6 (T25A/79T). “Vietnam: Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chomanan of Thailand Letter to Mt, 14 June 1979.”
  2. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0907/0009/10 ‘Cable From Kurt Waldheim to Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chamanan, 8 June 1979’.
  3. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0907/0009/10 ‘Letter From Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chamanan to Kurt Waldheim, 12 June 1979’.
  4. Ibid., p. 2.
  5. Ibid., p. 2.
  6. Ibid., p. 3.
  7. Ibid., p. 3.
  8. On this distinction, see Chantavanich, Supang, and E. Bruce Reynolds, eds. Indochinese Refugees: Asylum and Resettlement  Bangkok: Institutie of Asian Studies, 1988, p. 5, Sutter, Valerie O’Connor. The Indochinese Refugee Dilemma. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990, p. 101.
  9. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0907/0009/10 ‘Letter From Kurt Waldheim to Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chamanan, 15 June 1979’.
  10. Ibid., p. 2–3.
  11. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0907/0009/10 ‘Letter From Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chamanan to Kurt Waldheim, 18 June 1979’.
  12. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0907/0009/10 ‘Letter From Prime Minister of Thailand, General Kriangsak Chamanan to Kurt Waldheim, 2 November 1979’.
  13. In the same letter, General Kriangsak refers to the situation as “the holocaust in Kampuchea.” For a detailed analysis of Thailand's policy on Indochinese refugees, see Chantavanich, S., and P. Rabe. “Thailand and the Indochinese Refugees: Fifteen Years of Compromise and Uncertainty.” Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 18, no. 1 (1990): 66–80.
  14. CBS. “Sixty Minutes: The Island, 24 June 1979.” https://www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/Prr9V_w0aTH4zBnGCY3eFc_BmyENj5HR/the-island/.
  15. For a retrospective account of the project, see Jallot, Nicolas. “L’île de lumière, Quand la France sauve les boat people.” (2017): 65 min. For newsclips, see for example these excerpts from TF1’s evening news on April 18 https://www.ina.fr/video/CAB7900780801 or April 23, 1979 https://www.ina.fr/video/CAB7901308001/bateau-vietnam-video.html. For other retrospectives documentaries using footage shot by news production teams see https://www.rts.ch/archives/tv/information/temps-present/6716071-les-refugies-de-la-mer.html.
  16. See the feature film trailer here, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LPI4b0oCcfE. For documentaries see, https://www.rage.com.my/hell-island/#section-end.
  17. There are notable exceptions, such as Jim Laurie, who also ran stories on the war in Cambodia and refugees in Thailand. This understanding of the situation may come from the fact that he had already been reporting on the region years before the refugee crisis.