REPRESENTING REFUGEE CRISES

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

December 2019


The humanitarian response to the refugee crisis served political objectives. Public opinions did not always agree with what their governments had pledged at the 1979 conference. What does this tell us about refugee protection? How is it decided? And how does it happen in practice? This research project underscores the legal, political, and cultural dimensions of refugee protection. It shows that perceptions are the best way to understand how these three dimensions interact with one another. Different interpretations do not prevent effective protection. Nor do they remain unchanged overtime.

Contested Understandings of Displacement

States initially disagreed about the nature of displacement in Southeast Asia. The UNHCR considered they were refugees. Southeast Asian countries preferred to use “boat people” or “illegal immigrants” to refer to them. Vietnam thought they were evacuees. China, first considered they were nationals who deserved protection. Then Beijing reconciled with the idea that they were refugees.1 Differences in perception reveal so many different aspects of refugee protection. Where does the displaced person stand towards the national community? Do states have any legal obligation to protect them? Yet despite the discrepancies of perceptions, states found an effective compromise.

The Three Dimensions of Refugee Protection

Political and cultural dimensions of refugee protection matter as much as legal standards. Not all countries were party to the 1951 Convention related to the status of refugees. Yet the 1979 conference established a system of temporary and permanent asylum. It not only proved effective and long-lasting. Its protection also went beyond existing standards of refugee protection to provide resettlement without establishing whether people had a well -founded fear of persecution. Humanitarian concerns were a major motivation for this coordinated response. But the main thrust came from the Third Indochina War when States’ interests converged. Beijing’s determination to punish Vietnam joined Washington’s wish to isolate Vietnam. London urgently needed to shield Hong Kong from new arrivals.2

Cultural representations also influence refugee protection in various ways. States had a different perception of the crisis, who were the main victims and who or what were the main reasons for the population movement. So did public opinions. Media representations shows us that there was not one, but several stories of displacement. Discussions on refugees also reveal broader foreign policy debates. How to balance humanitarian and political interests? Should humanitarian interventions serve political objectives? They also ask important questions on domestic politics. Whose responsibility is it to protect vulnerable aliens? Should private citizens, provinces or the federal government accept and take care of refugees? And once in the host country, should refugees be considered as immigrants? These three dimensions show us that refugee protection calls for broader discussions. It questions the role of the state, the border of communities, and the responsibility human beings have for one another.


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References

  1. Their status on identity cards was guigo nanmin, meaning refugees who returned to China, Song, Lili. “China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present, and Potentials.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 37 (2018): 139–61. On its legal position, see Chiu, Hungdah. “Current Developments: China’s Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam.” American Journal of International Law 74, no. 3 (1980): 685–93.
  2. The emergency situation in Hong Kong was the main reason London sped up the process. Ideology and opposition to Vietnamese Communism  was another. Thatcher's government even took over US support to the Khmers Rouges by providing training, Pilger, John. “How Thatcher Gave Pol Pot a Hand.” The Newstatesman, 17 April 2000.