POLLING COUNTRIES

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

January 2020

The situation was critical. And the public opinion was becoming increasingly supportive of protecting refugees. But the Secretary-General was unsure what to do. He needed one essential confirmation to organize a conference. Several countries, including new ones, had to offer resettlement places. What could bring states to commit at the same time to grant asylum to refugees? The convergence of sixty-five states in July 1979 was not the result of a coincidence. The United Kingdom and the United States launched a major campaign to rally them into a multilateral solution. 

Assessing States’ Interest in A Conference

The Secretary General would not organize a conference without some diplomatic preparatory work. He sent a cable to several countries asking them whether they thought the United Nations should organize a conference. “If a Conference is to be called, what should be its purpose? (a) Should it be essentially on the humanitarian aspects of the problem and measures to help the refugees? (b) Should it also be on the political aspects of the problems?”1 The Secretary-General could not risk a failure. He had to be sure that states were on the same wavelength. Then he could set the objectives and the agenda of the meeting. 

Despite the accuracy of the questionnaire, many states avoided to respond altogether. Some supported the initiative. Others, responded in significant details and suggested how the meeting could address both objectives while bringing the emphasis on the humanitarian crisis.2 But each had a different interest in participating.

The Main Parties’ Reactions

Vietnam was unsure it wanted to come. On the one hand, it protested against the claim that it was the only one responsible to this problem. The main issue, according to Hanoi was double. First, someone had to do something regarding the Khmer Rouge’s genocide and the humanitarian crisis within Cambodia. Second, the collusion of Western states and China to maintain the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate representatives of Cambodia at the United Nations had to end. On the other one, Hanoi could not afford losing the moral and financial support of the UN. A greater protection of refugees could also bring the humanitarian crisis in Cambodia to the fore.

At the other end, several countries were strongly urging for such a conference. Southeast Asian states and Australia had been calling on the involvement of countries and more resettlement places so that they would not continue to assume an “unfair burden.” The United States, who had taken advantage of the refugee problem from the outset as a condition for the discussion of bilateral aid and the normalization of relationships between Hanoi and Washington, strongly supported the idea of a conference. Now the United Kingdom, both alarmed by Australia and worried about new arrivals in Hong Kong demanded an urgent meeting. When the Secretary General came to visit London, Margaret Thatcher insisted that the conference dealt with political issues.3 According to her, there was nothing to be expected from the Soviet Union, who was the only one who could influence Vietnam. The only country taking the initiative was the United States, but it was being unfairly criticized. It was therefore urgent that the United Nations take action.

China also supported the idea of a conference. It also conducted a smear campaign to put all the blame on Vietnam in June and July 1979. Press releases claimed that Vietnamese authorities were “creating and exporting refugees.”4 Beijing also hammered home the theme during meetings with other foreign representatives, such as Sri Lanka on July 2.5 Virtually all public statements revolved around the same issue. Vietnam was a threat for the peace and the stability of Asia because it was carrying out Moscow’s plans for “Soviet expansionism.”

But these countries alone could not provide enough resettlement places. They had to convince others to attend the conference. They tried to do so in international meetings. The Economic and Social Council meeting in 1979, was an excellent opportunity to show this common stand against Vietnam. The United Kingdom warned that the crisis in Indochina was a major threat for the peaceful development of the world economy. China did exactly the same a few days later. “While the holding of an international meeting to discuss the question of the refugee resettlement is needed, it is necessary to eradicate the root cause by way of stopping the forcible massive exportation of refugees by the Vietnamese authorities.”6 

What changed completely in Beijing’s accusations was that this time the displaced population were refugees. They were not Chinese nationals anymore. To be the victims that the international community wanted to rescue, these people had to be refugees. Hence Beijing made both semantic and strategic changes. China went to the meetings of the UNHCR executive committee it have never attended since becoming a member in 1971. Even the persons China resettled received an identity card which reflected this compromise. They were guigo nanmin, meaning “refugees returning to China.”7 Refugee protection had become the best way China could punish Vietnam.

Generating Momentum

Another way to mobilize states into protecting refugees was through bilateral dialogue. The UK was the most proactive in that respect. When Thatcher’s cabinet realized the urgent nature of the situation, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington proposed to conduct a public campaign.8 London reached out to its allies both in Latin America and in the Middle East.9 Many gained interest in protecting refugees. They would honor their ally’s request and show their commitment for human rights. Countries in Latin America, such as Chili or Argentina, could divert the attention from the persecution of their own citizens.10 Israel was also quick to react. As early as 1977, an Israeli ship rescued refugees on the high seas. It was in their view, a “natural” gesture, coming from a state itself created by refugees. Israel never admitted that this could deflect criticism at the 300,000 refugees the Six Days wars had generated.11

The United States supported this initiative. Washington even promised it would encourage ASEAN and ANZUS countries during official visits in June.12 The US President and Secretary of State would take advantage of their forthcoming trip in Asia. It “offer[ed] an excellent opportunity to enlist and coordinate broad support.”13 

Washington also envisioned other ways to pressure Vietnam. The White House knew that money was key to Vietnam’s survival. A memorandum noted that Vietnam receveid $150 million in multilateral aid and $130 million in bilateral assistance, essentially from Japan and European countries. “The impact of such economic sanctions would be enhanced if combined with an outcry of international public opinion, including denunciations by key Asian governments and the Nordics against the inhumanity of the Vietnamese”14 But the Soviet Union could compensate for any financial loss, Washington insisted. So “[i]nternational pressure would be of greatest effect if it stresses that the Soviets must share responsibility and opprobrium with Vietnam.”15 The stakes were high. A psychological blow would count as much as economic sanctions would in the American strategy. 

The meeting of the G7 countries in Tokyo on June 28, 1979 was the perfect opportunity to generate “momentum.”16 Jimmy Carter and Margaret Thatcher encouraged states to become involved. At the end of the meeting, the countries issued a special statement declaring their support to the organization of a conference. They also committed to back any international action regarding the crisis.17 Despite London’s determination to obtain a conference, Thatcher already took precautions to avoid resettling refugees. She convinced other states to change the statement so that G7 countries would not be the only ones responsible for protecting refugees. Instead, the use of “international action” would imply that the international community as a whole had to take adequate measures.18 This convinced ASEAN countries, meeting in Bali the same day. They issued a communiqué announcing they would take part in a conference.19

It would be wrong to believe that all participants to the conference were passive allies to Washington, London or Beijing. In fact, many states stressed their willingness to contribute out of humanitarian concerns. Some European countries for example, made clear that the humanitarian crisis was their number one priority. Yet this did not mean that a conference would be incompatible with their interests. The European Economic Community was actively seeking trading partnership with ASEAN states. After the end of the Glorious Thirty, creating a strategic partnership with countries in Southeast Asia, some of which would become “Dragons” or “Tigers,” was the best option for the future.  No partnership was even in sight at the time of the conference. But a first meeting had taken place in Brussels in November 1978 and both sides agreed to meet at a second meeting to negotiate a trade agreement.20 EEC countries were the third most important trading partner of ASEAN countries after the United States and Japan, taking 14.2% of their total trade.21 In that context, even states primarily concerned with humanitarian issues would not contradict Southeast Asian states’ claim that they were the main victims of the crisis. The United States knew that European states had an interest in the matter. In early July 1979, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said he was optimistic about the European states. They were at first unwilling to suspend bilateral aid to Vietnam. But the Irish Foreign Minister, traveling to Bali for the ASEAN meeting, said that the EEC “would undertake a new look at the matter.”22 Little by little, all the stars aligned for the organization of a conference. 

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References

  1. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_GEN_a. Letter from V. Dayal Executive Assistant to the High Commissioner to Poul Harting High Commissioner to Refugees, 15 June 1979. See the original in the Key Documents, https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/polling-countries/
  2. See the response of Japan, https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/japan-answer/, China, https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/china-answer/ or Vietnam https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/vietnam-answer/.
  3. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0990/ 0005/07. Note on a meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher, 12 July 1979.
  4. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_CHI. Bulletin d’information de la mission permanente de la République populaire de Chine, 21 juin 1979.
  5. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_CHI. People’s Republic of China, Mission to the United Nations, Press Release n. 106, 2 July 1979, Premier Hua Guofeng Speaks on Refugee Problem During His Meeting with Sri Lanka Foreign Minister.
  6. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_CHI. Statement by the Chinese Delegation, Delivered by the Chargé d’Affaire a.i. Yi Suzhi to the Second Regular Session, 1979, of the Economic and Social Council, 10 July 1979 (...) The question of Indochinese refugees has been created entirely by the Vietnamese authorities as a result of their pursuance of policies for expansion and aggression, ethnic discrimination and refugee exportation, for which they must bear full responsibilities.
  7. Song, Lili. “The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status,” diss., Victoria University of Wellington, 2014. For details on the legal status of these people, see Chiu, Hungdah. “Current Developments: China’s Legal Position on Protecting Chinese Residents in Vietnam.” American Journal of International Law 74, no. 3 (1980): 685–93. On their resettlement, see Zhu Rong. “China and the Indochinese Refugees,” edited by Supang Chantavanich, and E. Bruce Reynolds. Bangkok: Institutie of Asian Studies, 1988, pp. 80–102.
  8. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/129 f250. “Vietnam: No.10 Record of Conversation (Mt-Ministers) [Vietnamese Refugees], 29 May 1979.” Carrington was also the one inviting the press to visit refugee camps in Hong Kong with him after the G7 meeting in Tokyo, Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/789 f257. “Hong Kong: No.10 Record of Conversation (“Vietnamese Refugees”), 14 June 1979.”
  9. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/130 f62. “Vietnam: Mt Letter Prime Minister Begin of Israel (Vietnamese Refugees), 6 July 1979” or Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/130 f60. “Vietnam: Premier Price of Belize Letter to Mt, 6 July 1979.”
  10. See Sam Vong’s work.
  11. On those refugees, Peteet, J. (2005). Landscape of Hope and Despair, Palestinian Refugee Camps. Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania Press. On Vietnamese refugees resettled in Israel,Gandhi Espiritu, Evyn Le. Archipelago of Resettlement: Vietnamese Refugee Settlers in Guam and Israel-Palestine. Forthcoming.
  12. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/27. “G7: Tokyo Summit (Hunt Minute on Summit Dinner) [Japanese Want to Discuss Vietnamese Boat People], 18 June 1979.” Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/27 (T26A/79T). “G7: Mt Letter to President Carter (Salt II, CTB, Middle East, G7, Vietnam), 18 June 1979.” Carter agreed to discuss this issue during his visit of ASEAN and ANZUS countries before his arrival in Tokyo for the G7 summit, Margaret Thatcher Foundation/NLC-10R-21-4-1-3. “Vietnam: State Department Memo for Brezinski (“vice President Mondale’s Meeting on Indochinese Refugees, June 18 At 1:30 P.m.”) [Mt Proposes International Conference on Vietnam and Refugees].”
  13. FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XXII Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “Memorandum From the Us Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (Clark) to Vice President Mondale, 18 June 1979.” 611–13.
  14. Ibid.
  15. Ibid.
  16. FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XXII Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “Memorandum From the US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (Clark) to President Carter, 20 June 1979.” 474–79.
  17. For the statement, see the key documents here https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/g7-statement/.
  18. Margaret Thatcher Foundation/PREM19/28. “G7: Tokyo Summit (Session 2), 28 June 1979.”
  19. See the document here https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/asean-12thsummit/
  20. This second meeting eventually took place in Kuala Lumpur in March 1980, UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0913/0019/07. ASEAN – EEC Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, 7–8 March 1980, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
  21. Ibid., p. 2.
  22. FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XXII Southeast Asia and the Pacific. “Telegram From the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, 9 July 1979.” 866–73.