KURT WALDHEIM'S VISIT TO
VIETNAM AND CHINA
by PHI-VÂN NGUYEN
January 2020
The conflict between Vietnam, China, and Cambodia was dangerous. And there was no sign of improvement. As Vietnam continued to occupy Cambodia, the situation could deteriorate. What could the United Nations do about this? Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, went to an official tour of Asia. He stopped by several countries to promote peace and find a solution to the refugee crisis. Yet the tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia were on top of his priorities. Unlike other armed conflicts then, it was the only one which could involve major powers holding the atomic bomb.
Kurt Waldheim was not the first Secretary-General to promote peace in Asia. Before him, U-Thant had worked for the neutralization of the Vietnam War.1 Waldheim, in contrast, was not as energetic. In his memoir, the diplomat recalled his work on Cyprus, Palestine, or Korea.2 But in reality, the Secretary-General was not as passionate. He was quick to bend to the will of member states and prone to avoid confrontation.3 His handling of the Third Indochina War was no different. During his trip to Asia, Waldheim proposed his good offices to North and South Korea as well as between China and Vietnam. Yet neither of them considered that option.4
The First Visit to Hanoi
The Secretary-General first visited Hanoi between the two belligerents. There, Vietnamese officials warmly greeted him. It was the first time the highest official of the United Nations came to Hanoi. This completed Vietnam’ process of becoming a member of the UN family. It also established an excellent start for the establishment of inter-agency development programs. In fact, the official visit was planned before Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.5 Initially, Waldheim should have come on February 15, 1979 to celebrate the contribution of the UN in the country’s reconstruction. The visit was rescheduled to the end of April, because of the Sino-Vietnamese border war.6 Waldheim arrived in Hanoi on April 26. The Vietnamese representatives were looking forward to this “visit of friendship.” But they knew that they would discuss the political tensions with China.7
Vietnamese representatives insisted that they were not responsible for this crisis.8 Hanoi was trying to find a negotiated solution with Beijing. But there was one important point China disagreed. In Beijing’s view, the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the tensions at their border had to be negotiated together. For Hanoi though, these two matters were separate.
The Vietnamese knew though, that the Cambodian and the Chinese tensions were related. Nguyễn Duy Trình, the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained: “Immediately after the liberation of Vietnam, the Chinese encouraged the Kampuchean leaders to lead a border war against Vietnam, cut off aid and try to isolate Vietnam internationally.”9 Vietnam’s relations with ASEAN countries were cordial. And Hanoi had almost normalized its relations with Washington. It was only because of what happened in Cambodia that these relations had changed. Since then, China launched a campaign to ostracize Vietnam from the international community. More than ever, the United Nations had to remain supportive of Vietnam.
The Secretary-General also discussed the situation in Cambodia. He told Vietnamese officials that Vietnamese troops were a concern to many states – and not to China alone. ASEAN countries also worried about the political instability this generated. The Vietnamese Prime Minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, insisted that there was nothing to worry. Vietnam respected each countries’ independence. “But what Viet Nam had done in Cambodia was not an intervention. She [Vietnam] had been attacked and had to hit back. Pol Pot had perpetrated a genocide. To assist the oppressed was not an intervention.”10 Thus, the Vietnamese military campaign was not an invasion. It was a humanitarian intervention.
Next Stop, Beijing
After visiting Hanoi, Kurt Waldheim spent one day in Ho Chi Minh City before leaving to Beijing. This was not Kurt Waldheim’s first visit to China. The Secretary-General had already come in 1972, shortly after the People’s Republic of China’s admission into the UN. It was then the first time a UN official visited the PRC.
Despite this previous visit, Waldheim had no more success with China. Beijing’s officials proved also reluctant to discuss the Sino-Vietnamese tensions. Deng Xiaoping insisted that this was only a courtesy visit. Prime Minister Hua Guofeng and Foreign Minister Huang Hua had already explained China’s position. According to him, the Soviet Union had “pulled it out again” after their success in Afghanistan.11 The Soviet Union was luring the West into a détente. But in practice, Moscow was planning a conquest of the world. The Soviet Union was expanding its influence across Asia and Africa using Vietnam or Cuba. And ASEAN countries would be its next victims.12 Neither Vietnam nor China would ask the Secretary-General to offer his good offices. Their own bilateral negotiations did not make progress either. A solution to the crisis had to be reached differently.
References
- See Logevall, Fredrik. Choosing War: The Lost Change for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Waldheim, Kurt. The Challenge of Peace. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1980.
- Fröhlich, Manuel, and Williams Abiodun. The UN Secretary-General and the Security Council: A Dynamic Relationship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0004/12 ‘Annual Report of the United Nations Secretary General to the United Nations General Assembly’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes on a Meeting Held in the Secretary-General’s Office, 19 December 1978’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes for the File From Rafeeudin Ahmed About Ha Van Lau’s Phone Call Proposing a Visit Commencing February 15, 5 January 1979’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes on a Meeting in the Office of the Secretary-General on 15 March At 5.00 Pm’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes on a Meeting At the Palace of the Presidency in Hanoi on 27 April 1979, 5pm-6.30 Pm’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes on a Meeting Between the Secretary-General and the Foreign Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, M. Nguyen Duy Trinh, 26 April 1979’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/11 ‘Notes on a Meeting At the Palace of the Presidency in Hanoi on 27 April 1979, 5pm-6.30 Pm’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/14 ‘Notes on a Meeting Held During the Secretary-General’s Visit to Beiking, 1 May 1979, Present: The Secretary-General, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC, Vice Foreign Minister Chang Wen Ching of the PRC, Two Officials of the Foreign Ministry, Mr. Rafeeudin Ahmed, Ferdinand Mayrhofer-Gründhel, François Giuliani, 1 May 1979’.
- UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/14 ‘Notes on a Meeting in the Great People’s Palace in Peking on 30 April 1979, 9 a.m.’