UNHCR_11_2_39-391_39[c]page152DecConsultationsCropped

THE 1978 DECEMBER CONSULTATIONS

by  PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

January 2020

The Hai Hong incident revealed a major problem in the international protection of refugees. Smugglers had pretended that their ship and its crew was in distress. But neighbouring states discovered the trick. They provided assistance on board and refused to let boats land on their shores. The UNHCR regional representative in Malaysia took a strong stance. He declared that the passengers were refugees. New questions emerged from this stalemate. Could people using smuggling channels be considered refugees? How could the UNHCR and states protect them? Thirty-nine states gathered in a consultation meeting held in December 1978. The meeting underscored the interdependent nature of refugee protection and established an early response to the crisis.  

The UNHCR Calls for a Consultation Meeting

At first, the UNHCR did not organize the meeting to address the problems raised by the Hai Hong incident. Its Executive Committee met in its twenty-ninth session in October 1978. Members recommended that interested parties in the Southeast Asian crisis met for a Consultative meeting.  That meeting would take place on December 11-12 1978, in Geneva. But the Hai Hong incident strongly influenced the course of the meeting.

The incident received media attention on November 10. Poul Hartling, the High Commissioner for Refugees, seized this opportunity to build momentum. On November 13, he made a statement to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. He called on the General Assembly’s support in calling states to contribute to the crisis. He underscored the need to help all refugees, including those in Africa and Latin America. But he also insisted that the case of “boat people” in Southeast Asia required a global approach. Both neighbouring countries and resettlement countries had to coordinate their action. “It is evident that the pace of resettlement has an influence on the capacity of countries in the region to receive new arrivals and on the development of local possibilities for self-sufficiency (…)”.1 The lack of coordination and trust had led countries to ignore calls for rescue from ships. The meeting was the opportunity to address the problem of asylum and rescue at sea.

The High Commissioner’s statement to the General Assembly’s Third Committee made an impact. The General Assembly voted a resolution based on the report of the Third Committee. The Assembly urged states “to continue to facilitate the work of the High Commissioner.”2 This resolution did not prioritize one crisis over another. But Poul Hartling did not hesitate to stress the importance of the Consultation Meeting on Southeast Asia.

A Background Note and Agenda for the Meeting

The day the General Assembly voted this resolution, Hartling sent a note to participating countries. The text set the background situation and an agenda of the meeting.3 The situation was urgent. It required a coordinated approach and had to address the problem of ships in distress.

The rate of departure accelerated at this time. Yet the number of resettlement could not keep up with the pace, thus creating an important backlog. Since there was no sign of more resettlement places, Southeast Asian states became reluctant to grant asylum.

The High Commissioner first exposed what he called “land cases.” Since 1975, almost 200,000 people had arrived in Thailand. Only thirty percent of them resettled in third countries, mostly France and the United States. “Land cases” arriving in Vietnam were no luckier. Using Vietnamese authorities’ estimations, 150,000 people had arrived from Democratic Kampuchea. 

Land Cases 1975 1976 1977 1978 to 31st of Oct. Cumulative Total
Arrivals
77,169
32,931
31,214
51,378
192,692
Departures
12,755
22,859
10,936
17,271
63,821
Remaining caseload
64,414
74,486
94,764
128,871
–

“Boat cases” also experienced a major backlog. UNHCR’s statistics up to mid October 1978, noted that of all 34,855 arrivals, only 10% had resettled in a third country. Besides, the rate of arrivals had increased since September 1978. The absolute numbers were lower than “land cases.” But the greater rate of acceleration made “boat cases” a very serious one. 

Boat Cases Aug 75/76 1977 1978 to 31st of Oct. Cumulative Total Not accepted as of 31st of Oct.
Australia
111
861
663
1,635
–
Hong Kong
196
1,007
4,956
6,159
3,546
Indonesia
244
679
2,458
3,381
1,623
Japan
348
851
678
1,877
636
Malaysia
1,157
5,817
33,172
40,146
23,532
Philippines
712
1,153
2,443
4,308
2,130
Singapore
121
308
1,611
2,040
847
Thailand
2,699
4,536
4,599
11,834
1,684
17 other countries (each under 350 total)
37
452
853
1,342
205
Total Arrivals
5,625
15,664
51,433
72,722
34,203
Departures
2,332
9,571
22,952
34,855
Remaining
3,293
9,386
37,867 (of whom 3,664 accepted)
The main issue, according to the High Commissioner, was temporary asylum. Poul Hartling suggested that Southeast Asian countries could not remain uninvolved. Providing relief on board and escorting boats further away was a major problem. But it was impossible to consider temporary and permanent asylum in isolation. The two had to come together.

The UNHCR’s preparatory note underlined the key topics of discussion. It also made a firm statement about the need to find a solution. The context leading to these people’s departure was highly political. But to achieve results, the meeting would focus on the humanitarian dimension of the problem. By reminding everyone of the United Nations General Assembly’s resolution, it also reiterated the position of the UNHCR. Although the note used words such as “boat cases” and “land cases” to describe the situation, these people were refugees, regardless of how they left.

Participating States Meet in Geneva

Thirty-eight countries met in Geneva for this Consultation meeting.4 Not all were party to the 1951 Convention related to the refugee status. They were first asylum states, countries of resettlement, or members of the executive committee. The purpose was not to bring them into a greater recognition of the Convention. The legal basis for this meeting was customary maritime law – the duty to rescue ships. Together they had to find a solution to the crisis. 

Poul Hartling’s opening statement evoked the case of The Hai Hong. What happened to the ship summarized the current state of the refugee crisis. For weeks, the ship could stop nowhere and was no one’s concern. Yet it was precisely because it was nobody’s concern that everybody had to deal with this issue. Hence states from across the globe mobilized to receive the cargo freighter’s passengers.

UNHCR is an organization, not a country. By itself, UNHCR can neither grant asylum, nor provide resettlement, nor any durable solution.

Poul Hartling, 11 December 1978 Tweet

He also pointed at the responsibility of governments. The UNHCR could only coordinate asylum and resettlement. Only states –and not his organization, could grant asylum. “Sometimes the obvious needs to the stated: UNHCR is an organization, not a country. By itself, UNHCR can neither grant asylum, nor provide resettlement, nor any durable solution.”5

The conversation during this two-day meeting would remain private. “We can and should speak frankly and freely, for that is the only way in which we will reach practical conclusions.” States did not need to fear about what they said. But declarations would not suffice. By the end of the meeting, states had to decide a course of action, he declared. 

Sharing the Burden

The meeting’s report gives us an excellent overview of the discussions. Sheltered from media scrutiny, government representatives outlined their prime concern. The displaced population was not the only victim of this crisis. The governments’ interventions stressed the idea that states neighboring Vietnam were most vulnerable. Australia, which was one of the few country party to the 1951 Convention, insisted that the burden was unfair. “(…) no nation, because of its geographical situation alone, could agree to be a passive recipient of very large numbers of refugees and displaced persons, potentially even a transfer of population, nor to being viewed by others as the inevitable recipient of such movements.”6 

Almost all other countries in Southeast Asia, concurred with this idea. The burden had to be shared more equally.7 Their situation was even more desperate than Australia. They were developing countries.8 And they faced a high population density.9 Other participating countries did not rebuke the idea that the focus could shift on states, rather than refugees. Many paid tribute to the efforts made by Thailand and Malaysia.10 Yet they also claimed that they already assumed a fair share of resettlement. So this responsibility also needed to be redistributed better.11

Several representatives came up with propositions. For Canada and the United States, the solution was a multilateral approach. Rescue at sea and temporary asylum would work only if there was a guarantee of resettlement and certainty that there would be no residual cases.12 Other countries suggested that repatriation was a possibility. Australia insisted that the international community had to made a distinction between genuine refugees and others. There were people who deserved protection and people who had to be repatriated.13 Other countries echoed the need to explore voluntary repatriation.14 Resettlement elsewere in the region was another option.15 But everyone knew that it was easier said than done.

A large proportion of the refugees were ethnic Chinese. These people had lived for generations in Vietnam. But China claimed they were Chinese nationals in its dispute with Vietnam. For this meeting, no one knew what Beijing’s position was. Despite being a member of the executive committee, China was not present. So whether repatriation was a possibility remained a question mark. Two representatives wondered whether Beijing would be ready to become a resettlement country. The representative of Malaysia first brought up the question. He urged the High Commissioner to inquire with the People’s Republic of China on that matter.16  The Vietnamese representative followed up. He mentioned that there were many ethnic Chinese among the refugees fleeing Democratic Kampuchea. But they had not “yet been accepted by their proper country.”17 Everyone knew that repatriation was highly unlikely. That could involve the repatriation of all persecuted ethnic Chinese in the region. But the focus did not remain on China. Vietnam became the principal target of the discussions. 

Many representatives worried that Vietnam was encouraging departures. Rumours claimed that Vietnamese authorities took payments from the population leaving the territory.18 Vietnam tried to deflect criticism on China.19 But this attempt fell short. In fact, the Vietnamese representative did not even deny the rumour. Instead, he declared that there were many reasons people left. These people could not adapt to the “productive needs” of the post-war situation. 20 A “foreign power” incited them to leave the country. 21 Or that it was war and poverty which caused their departure. Vietnam needed everyone’s contribution after the war. So the government had no desire to see this population outflow. But “it was powerless to prevent it.”22

Several representatives accepted part of this explanation. Many acknowledged that poverty was the core reason for departure. 23 But the meeting had to pursue more realistic goals. So Poul Hartling recommended to take two urgent actions. More countries had to offer resettlement. “First, governments – on the widest basis – must agree to accept a greater number of refugees than hitherto. They must do so on a regular, yearly basis, so that the countries of first asylum can be assured that they will not be left with residual problems.”24 Second, countries had to raise their financial contributions to the UNHCR. This was the basic groundwork for a multilateral solution to the refugee crisis. 

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References

  1. ‘Statement By Mr. Poul Hartling, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 13 November 1978’, accessed 9 January 2020 https://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/3ae68fb00/statement-mr-poul-hartling-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees-third.html
  2. ‘Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Third Committee, United Nations General Assembly (33rd Session: 1978-1979), 29 November 1978’, accessed 9 January 2020 https://www.unhcr.org/en-in/excom/bgares/3ae69ee418/report-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html
  3. This part relies on this document UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_39d ‘Note By the High Commissioner, 29 November 1978, Consultative Meeting With Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, Geneva 11-12 December 1978’ which is available in the Key Documents section of this website.
  4. Participating states were: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Holy See, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam. Several United Nations agencies and international NGOs also attended the meeting: he World Food Programme (WFP), the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO). The following intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations were represented: the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the League of the Red Cross Societies (IRCS), the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVA), and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) Mr. Newsom, the U.S. Under-Secretary for Political Affairs was accompanied with several U.S. Congress Representatives.
  5. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_39c ‘Opening Statement By the High Commissioner, 11 December 1978, Consultative Meeting With Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, Geneva 11-12 December 1978’.
  6. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_39d ‘Draft Summary Report, Consultative Meeting With Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia, Geneva 11-12 December 1978’, §13.
  7. Ibid., §18 for Thailand, §27 Malaysia who “bear the brunt of the refugee crisis”, §82 Singapore, §89 Indonesia, §96 The Philippines.
  8. Ibid., Thailand §15, Malaysia §28, Indonesia, §92.
  9. Ibid., Singapore, §82.
  10. Ibid., See Australia, the United States, France or Canada for example.
  11. Australia, §11, The United States §24, and even Canada §42, 27.
  12. Ibid., The United States §25, Canada §44, Austria §51.
  13. Ibid., §12.
  14. Ibid., Thailand §18, France §56, Switzerland §69.
  15. Ibid., Austria §50, Belgium §86.
  16. Ibid., §107.
  17. Ibid., §108.
  18. Ibid., The United Kingdom §67 for example. Barry Wain’s extensive reporting explains that this payment was a counterpart to the work the Vietnamese authorities did to help The Southern Cross navigate the Saigon River or The Hai Hong transport the population from the shore to the ship, Wain, B. (1981), The Refused, the Agony of the Indochina Refugees, New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 21.
  19. Ibid., §115
  20. Ibid., §36, 37.
  21. Ibid., §137.
  22. Ibid., §137.
  23. Ibid., The United Kingdom §67 or Sweden §52 for example.
  24. Ibid., §157.