THE BRITISH DISEASE

The British Response to the Southeast Asian Crisis of 1979

SIMON BOILY

March 2021

Conditions inside an Indochinese refugee camp in Hong Kong. 57

In 1979, two crises imbricated themselves in Southeast Asia. One was humanitarian. Since 1975, the two communist victories in Cambodia and Vietnam caused a massive exodus in the region, the situation only worsened when armed conflict erupted between the two in 1978. The other was political. Tensions between China and Vietnam amounted to an attempted military invasion. For the United Kingdom, Hong Kong’s fate became an important stake in Southeast Asia. As the colony risked being flooded with Indochinese refugees, Margaret Thatcher turned her attention to the international community.

On the 31st of May 1979, Margaret Thatcher convinced the international community to intervene multilaterally in the Southeast Asian refugee crisis. 1 However, the United Kingdom only accepted a remarkably low number of these refugees. How and why did the Prime Minister minimize Britain’s participation in the international response to the crisis?

Previous studies on the role of the United Kingdom in the Southeast Asian refugee crisis concentrate on the resettlement of refugees, or on the foreign policy led by London during the crisis itself. 2 Nevertheless, a study of the prime minister’s archives shows that Thatcher proposed a multilateral solution precisely to limit the number of resettled refugees in Great Britain. This response to the crisis was meant to cure the “British disease.” The latter was a concept put forth by certain journalists and political scientists to reference the feeling of decline in the United Kingdom after the Second World War. 3

Precursor Symptoms of the British Disease (1945-1978)

On the eve of the First World War, Great Britain was an imperial power that controlled 25% of the world’s emerged land. An entire world system composed of labour, primary resources and strategic outposts was organized in coordination with its territories to benefit the British people. Just thirty years later, as the Second World War was ending, this foundation was crumbling. Without India, once its proudest colony, the empire was struggling. “The British system survived. But the cost of staying alive was enormous and the collateral damage irreparable.” 4 Other nations, inspired by India, also claimed their national independence. In order to avoid a complete rupture with its former colonies, the United Kingdom had to compromise. Its relations with the territories would now be fraternal instead of imperial. A more reciprocal sharing of economic resources and a certain freedom of movement of “Empire peoples” would now be permitted. In addition, the United States replaced Great Britain the world’s greatest economic power. London found itself in a situation of subordination. However, the blow was mitigated by the strategic role it held against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In reaction to this loss of power nationalist policies, such as a welfare state, aimed to guarantee the economic and social well-being of its citizens. The English people had a right to these services, they had to be differentiated from other Empire peoples. While these social differences already existed, they were strengthened thanks to these nationalist policies, which in turn encouraged a powerful xenophobic nationalism. During the same period, many industries were nationalized. This nationalization of production created a British national capitalism. Historic source of nationalism for the British, the economy did not disappoint during the glorious thirty. 5

For some, the loss of British power did not go unnoticed. It was an unnatural state interpreted to be a decline. David Edgerton calls this sentiment: “Declinism.” 6 Some intellectual and political leaders such as Enoch Powell – a renowned advocate of xenophobic nationalism during the 1960s 7– started to evoke this loss of power as an existential threat. According to Social Darwinism’s logic, this would entail the extinction of the British people. Others reacted energetically to this interpretation, they professed that the decline was only a temporary ailment, which was to be urgently cured. Britain suffered from a disease. Once cured, its privileged position on the international scene would be restored.

Of all those who wanted to cure Britain of this disease, Margaret Thatcher was the most determined. She maintained the principles of nationalism, of British privilege as well as exclusivity. In fact, she proclaimed: “(…) nationhood, nation states and national sovereignty are the best foundations for a stable international system.” 8 And in 1950 at the conservative party’s convention:

We are proud of the British Commonwealth and Empire. We believe it has a part to play in the future of the world. By its action in 1939 it saved the forces of freedom and democracy from extinction. We reaffirm the principle of Imperial preference, believing that it will help both us and the Empire peoples to solve our economic difficulties. 9

This declaration stokes an imperial flame as well as a nationalist bias. “Us” and “Empire peoples” are kept separate, as if there were two perceived classes in this new British imperial system. Margaret Thatcher used these sentiments, she maintained openly that an influx of migrants would “Submerge” the British people and would endanger its “diplomatic” character. 10 On top of that: “those who pried themselves moderates” had lost their “moral courage” and were passing radical socialist policies regularly, including liberal migration policies. 11 It was imperative to stop and to fight back against the arrival of refugees in the United Kingdom. The British people agreed. In February 1979, a chief housing officer talking about an influx of refugees noticed: “Without wishing to sound racialist… Legally, we have to house them, but I sympathise (sic) with local people who see this as an intrusion.” 12 There existed a xenophobic sentiment in Britain. Too many migrants were arriving according to this ideal, they were threatening British prosperity.

Thatcher was elected because she convinced the electorate she had the cure to the British disease. In her book “The Path to Power” what she calls “the onward march of socialism” 13 is the incarnation of the British disease. This anticommunism explains the sudden reheating of the cold war with the help of President Reagan in the 1980s. 14

It was at the beginning of 1979, known as the “Winter of discontent” when enormous strikes were paralyzing the public sector that Thatcher knew she was in position to win. 15 “I had my chance, my only chance. I must seize it with both hands.” 16 Indeed, these strikes caused a great anger in non-unionized Britons, they started to believe that unions, symptoms of the advance of socialism, had too much power. 17 According to Thatcher, people were finally realizing with their votes the extent to which the “Disease” of socialism had spread.

The Turning Point of the Sickness (1979)

As soon as she was elected in 1979, Thatcher was faced with a problem that threatened to deteriorate Britain’s condition: the Southeast Asian refugee crisis. The United Kingdom was at risk of accepting many tens of thousands of refugees. British interests in the region were still very important, Hong Kong remained one of the last crown jewels of the empire. The British had implemented a “Just and respected legal system” and still extracted profits from the colony. 18 However, the territory was bearing the brunt of the arrival of 30,000 refugees and was accepting 300 more every day on average. 19 On May 23rd, 923 refugees arrived in Hong Kong thanks to a high-sea rescue from the M.V. Sibonga, an English ship. Due to lack of space in Hong Kong, these refugees had to be directly accepted in the United Kingdom. The 923 would have been a meager addition in France or in the United States, who had already resettled 30,000 each. 20 Britain, however, had only resettled 1923 refugees since 1979. 21 By itself, this ship alone could increase the number of Indochinese refugees in the United Kingdom by half.

See Poul Hartling’s background note on the web site58

Moreover, many other British ships who had rescued “boat people” had trouble finding the nearest port of call and risked ending up in Hong Kong. The M.V. Roach Bank rescued 293 refugees in the high seas. Its nearest port of call was Taiwan. However, the local authorities refused to let the Roach Bank land unless 346 refugees went directly to the United Kingdom. 22 Malaysia and Indonesia had acted similarly in 1978 with the Hai Hong, a cargo ship transporting 2,500 refugees. The progressive closing of all Asian ports threatened to make Hong Kong the de facto port of call for “sea cases” in Southeast Asia simply because they did not outright reject new arrivals. 23

The Thatcher government risked betraying its electoral promises by accepting so many refugees, but there were few alternatives. Her cabinet even considered rescinding its signature from the 1951 convention relative to refugee status. 24 Yet that was unfeasible. In fact, the Iron lady often mentioned in cabinet meetings that public opinion would never permit the rejection or the deportation of refugees as Malaysia or Indonesia had done. 25 National media claimed that more refugees needed to be resettled: “There are no excuses for letting people drown.” 26 Fortunately for Thatcher, the Secretary General of the United Nations urged states involved in the crisis to raise their financial contributions and resettlement quotas. 27This was the exit Thatcher had been waiting for. An international campaign could limit the humanitarian burden by sharing it with other states of the international community. On May 31st, Thatcher responded to the Secretary General’s call and proposed an international conference on the Southeast Asian Refugees. 28

If there was someone to blame according to London, it was Vietnam. Hanoi waged wars against its neighbours and was exporting its overpopulation problem to the rest of Asia. 29 It had to be “pilloried,” on an international scale if possible. The proposed conference would serve two goals for Britain. First, it would stop the influx of refugees to Hong Kong. Secondly, it would lay the blame for the crisis on Vietnam and international communism. An important goal for the United Kingdom in the context of the Cold War. 30 This denunciation would become even more important after the invasion of Afghanistan at the hand of the USSR in December 1979.

Margaret Thatcher and Jimmy Carter discuss during a visit to the white house in 1979. 59

Thus, Thatcher launched an international campaign to increase the number of resettlement places for Indochinese refugees in ports outside of Hong Kong, and to generate international support for a conference organized by the United Nations on the subject. The United States had been trying to cultivate similar support, the diplomatic path they chose had not been adequate. 31 Initially, Thatcher’s campaign received little support since states involved in the crisis believed to have already done enough. 32 The government thus planned to bring a cohort of journalists to Hong Kong with the minister of Foreign Affairs to expose to the public the scale of the humanitarian crisis in the colony. 33 By doing so the British government was attempting to stimulate an international democratic pressure in favour of a conference. In conjunction with the United States, the pressures enacted culminated in a multilateral declaration from the G7 after their meeting in July 1979. 34 Present states pledged to support any international conference aiming to enforce international action to respond to the Southeast Asian refugee Crisis.

The conference took place in Geneva less than a month later. It found a sustainable solution to the crisis. 35 Vietnam accepted to limit the number of departures and Asian countries would now recognize the refugee status of new arrivals. All the refugees that arrived in Hong Kong would not be obliged to resettle in the United Kingdom. The British minister of Foreign Affairs promised that London would resettle 10,000 refugees over two years. 36 However, refugees from the Sibonga and any other English ship would be deducted from the total.

The british press strongly reacted to this international mobilization. According to some, the resettlement of 10,000 refugees “would be a drop in the ocean of over 300,000 refugees.” 37 The Listener responded to the media coverage of the crisis with pronounced cynicism: “ […] television should not be dragged along to world events as though it is part of the government’s propaganda machine.” 38 A media campaign seemed absurd when the crisis was perpetuating itself. Despite this criticism, Thatcher was able to rally public opinion. The threat of communism and the protection of refugees converged to become one single issue. Even critical outlets accepted that the refugees resettled in Britain would be victims of communist tyranny. The Economist saw a parallel between this exodus and the flight of the Armenians from Ottoman rule, of the Jews in Nazi Germany or of political dissidents in the Soviet Union. 39 Thatcher had found a resolution to the crisis without having to resettle too many refugees within the United Kingdom.

Forbidding Sequelae (1979)

In 1979, it seemed Margaret Thatcher had found the answer to the British disease. She had to limit refugee resettlement in the United Kingdom by sharing the burden of new arrivals with the international community. This system would be long-winded. It contributed to the reheating of the cold war after the invasion of Afghanistan which expedited posturing against communism. Over the following years, British foreign policy focused on Hong Kong’s stability and the support of the Khmer rouges in Cambodia. 40 There remained, however, many challenges that risked compromising the equilibrium found at the Geneva conference.

This equilibrium, product of a multilateral agreement, worked thanks to the participation of the United States, the UN and of the states involved in the crisis. Britain had to be flexible to satisfy its partners. They insisted that all participate to the humanitarian relief in Southeast Asia. The volume of refugees leaving Vietnam was used by the United States to humiliate the former on the international stage. 41Between 1978 and 1982, they resettled 282,500 refugees 42 while London only managed to resettle 22,500. 43 It is because of the severe pressures put on by the UN and the United States that London doubled their original resettlement quota of 10,000. The former did not believe that sea rescues should be deducted from the total Britain had promised in Geneva in 1979. Thatcher had to be flexible to preserve Hong Kong’s stability.

In November 1980, another piece of this system began to fail. Thailand refused to accept 93 refugees saved on the high seas by a British ship, the M.V. Logos, without the guarantee that they would not stay in Thailand. Like in 1979 when dealing with Taiwan, London did not want Hong Kong to become the only remaining destination for refugees in Southeast Asia. However, Margaret Thatcher accepted these refugees due to a triple pressure. First, the owners of the ship in question were favourable to the resettlement of the refugees. Second, a charitable organization in Britain, Project Vietnam Orphans, mobilized itself to help the refugees. Finally, the bishop of Canterbury exerted his influence in British society and in parliament to encourage the resettlement of the refugees in the United Kingdom. 44 Wishing to avoid compromising a system of resettlement that suited the British government, Thatcher had to yield.

Three years later, it was not Thailand interfering in the balance of the system. This time, elected representatives in Hong Kong began to invoke the concept of voluntary repatriation of refugees in 1983. This proposition directly challenged the established system accepting all persons fleeing Vietnam. Nonetheless, these pressures alone would not suffice to put into question the validity of the consensus found in Geneva in 1979. As long as Vietnam constituted a regional threat, refugees would continue to emigrate from Southeast Asia to the four corners of the world thanks to the support of the United States. This changed in the middle of the 1980s. Vietnam announced economic reforms in 1986. It also promised to withdraw from Cambodia. Despite these promises, 15,000 new boat people arrived in Hong Kong. 45 In response, the territory decided to enact strict new criteria of refugee definition. Now, “economic migrants” would be held and repatriated to Vietnam. 46 Margaret Thatcher explained this move at a press conference in Bangkok: “Hong Kong simply cannot go on taking people whom we believe now are not refugees.” 47 This new policy was officially enacted in July 1988. 48 It was “in accordance with international practice on the treatment of illegal immigrants.” 49 The change was well perceived in Hong Kong and by Conservative British media. 50 Thus, a new consensus emerged. The Geneva conference of 1989 was sanctioned by the UN. It renounced the system established in 1979 and institutionalized the new “internationally recognized refugee criteria.” 51

President George H.W. Bush meets with Thatcher at Camp David in 1989. 60

This new policy was contested since its conception in 1983, by Reagan and his successor. The United States, led by President Bush, opposed voluntary repatriation during a meeting at Camp David with Thatcher in 1989. 52 Media was also critical of the new consensus and of the camps in which refugees were kept in Hong Kong, which resembled “prison conditions.” 53 Large protests against the immigration policy, and their violent repression shook refugee camps in Hong Kong. This repression solicited the attention of the media. 54 Many activist groups were interested in Hong Kong for the following years. 55 All these contestations did not change the conviction of the Thatcher government: “Until some were sent back, more would just keep on coming.” 56

Conclusion

There are three conclusions to be made here. Firstly, it is indispensable to understand that Thatcher’s fight against socialism was made through domestic policy as well as foreign policy. It was not dogmatic, however; it was tainted by poignant pragmatism and flexibility which helped her bypass political challenges. Secondly, notwithstanding the refugee-friendly disposition of certain members of British society and media, the political dimensions of resettlement are not to be ignored. They caused the United Kingdom to resettle more than twice what it had promised in Geneva in 1979. Finally, it is ironic that nationalist, even xenophobic, policies are the ones to have encouraged a humanitarian response to the crisis. The solution put forth limited the number of refugees resettled by the United Kingdom and contributed to the ideological ideal of its return to dominance. It is hard to qualify Thatcher as a good faith actor in the refugee crisis. Despite her humanitarian means, her end was far from it.

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References

  1. See the article “Margaret Thatcher’s Proposal” on the web site for context on this event. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/thatcher-proposal/.
  2. See Bailkin, Jordanna. Unsettled: refugee camps and the making of multicultural Britain. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. For a resource on the resettlement of refuges. See Pilger, John. “How Thatcher Gave Pol Pot a Hand.” New Statesman, 17 April 2000. For an analysis of foreign policy.
  3. These journalists used it in this book Caryl Christian, and Bryson, Timm. Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century, 2014. As well as these political scientists Crines, Andrew S., Timothy Heppell, and Peter Dorey. “Conclusion.” In The Political Rhetoric and Oratory of Margaret Thatcher, edited by Andrew S. Crines, Timothy Heppell, and Peter Dorey, p. 209–22. Rhetoric, Politics and Society. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016.
  4. Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 653.
  5. I am using this article to describe “British national capitalism” Edgerton, David. “How Britain Was Sold.” 13 November 2019 https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2019/11/how-britain-was-sold. Also, Kumar, Krishan. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge Cultural Social Studies. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. For an analysis of British nationalism.
  6. Edgerton, David. The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History. London, UK: Allen Lane, 2018.
  7. An analysis of Britain’s racism, Edgerton, David. “Britain’s Persistent Racism Cannot Simply Be Explained by Its Imperial History | David Edgerton.” The Guardian, June 24, 2020.
  8. Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power. New York: Harper Collins, 1995. p. 522
  9. Edgerton, David. The Rise and Fall of the British Nation: A Twentieth-Century History. [London], UK: Allen Lane, 2018, p. 253.
  10. “TV Interview for Granada World in Action (‘rather Swamped’),” January 27, 1978. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103485.
  11. Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power. New York: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 439-440.
  12. "‘Godfather’s’ Instant Homes for Migrants.” Daily Mail, February 5, 1979.
  13. Ibid. P. 394. Also see her other book. Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. 1st ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993.
  14. Ibid. P. 394. Also see her other book. Thatcher, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. 1st ed. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993.
  15. Caryl, Christian. Strange Rebels: 1979 and the Birth of the 21st Century. Basic Books, 2014. Also, “1979: Public Sector Strike Paralyses Country.” BBC News, January 22, 1979. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/22/newsid_2506000/2506715.stm.
  16. Thatcher, Margaret. The Path to Power. New York: Harper Collins, 1995, p. 433.
  17. An old chief of police compares a Labour Party victory to the reign of the third Reich in Nazi Germany. “The Gospel According to Sir Robert Mark.” Daily Mail, April 19, 1979.
  18. Hampton, Mark. Hong Kong and British Culture, 1945-97. Studies in Imperialism. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015.
  19.  “Cartledge Note to Margaret Thatcher,” 24 may 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118030.
  20. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_39d. “Note by the High Commissioner, 29 November 1978, Consultative Meeting with Interested Governments on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, Geneva 11-12 December 1978.”
  21. “Home Office Letter to No. 10 (“Refugees from Vietnam”)”, 29 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118056.
  22. “Home Office Letter to No. 10 (“Refugees from Vietnam”)”, 29 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118056.
  23. “Home Office Letter to No. 10 (“Refugees from Vietnam”)”, 29 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118056.
  24. “Havers Minute to MT (“Vietnamese Refugees”)”, 30 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118040.
  25. See the article “Southeast Asian Countries Reject Arrivals” on the web site. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/rejecting-arrival/ Also see this phone call “No. 10 Record of Telephone Conversations (MT-Whitelaw, MT-Carrington)”, 4 June 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118045.
  26. “Rescuing Is Right.” The Economist, 2 June 1979.
  27. See the article “An Appeal for Contributions” on the web site for an analysis of the Secretary General’s letter. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/unsg-appeal/.
  28. “Margaret Thatcher Letter to UN Secretary-General Waldheim,” 31 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118043. Also available on the web site. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/uk-proposal/.
  29. See the article “Margaret Thatcher’s Proposal” on the web site. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/thatcher-proposal/.
  30. Ibid. See also, for an analysis of the United Kingdom’s foreign policy during the cold war. Hill, Christopher. The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, 2002.
  31. “UKE Washington to FCO (“Vietnamese Refugees”),” 29 May 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118039.
  32. “Carrington Minute to MT (“Vietnamese Refugees”)“ 8 June 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118051.
  33. “No. 10 Record of Conversation (“Vietnamese Refugees”)” 14 June 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/138430.
  34. See the article “Polling Countries” on the web site for a more detailed recounting of the meeting. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/polling/.
  35. See the article “The July 1979 Conference” for a description of the conference. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rssen/timeline/jul79-conference/.
  36. “No. 10 Record of Conversation (MT-Whitelaw-Carrington),” 9 July 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/118073.
  37. “Her Instinct Is Wrong.” The Economist, 14 July 1979.
  38. Robinson, Kenneth. “Not Very Good News.” The Listener, 5 July 1979.
  39. “Not Again.” The Economist, 21 July 1979.
  40. Pilger, John. “How Thatcher Gave Pol Pot a Hand.” New Statesman, 17 April 2000.
  41. See the article “Ten Years of Refugee Protection” on the web site for an analysis of the American position. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/rp/map-refugee-protection/.
  42. Gall, Susan, and Irene Natividad, ed. Library of Asian America. Vol. 1. Detroit: Gale Research Inc, 1996.
  43. Bailkin, Jordanna. Unsettled: refugee camps and the making of multicultural Britain. First edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Chapter “Interlude: before the camps.”
  44. “FCO letter to No. 10 (“Vietnamese refugees: MV Logos”).” 20 September 1980. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/127349.
  45. “CAB 128/91/1 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet Held at 10 Downing Street.” 9 July 1988. The National Archives.
  46. “EC/46/SC/CRP.44 Update on Regional Developements in Asia and Oceania.” UNHCR, 19 August 1996. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee.
  47. “Press Conference in Bangkok.” 8 August 1988. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107321.
  48. “CAB 128/91/1 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet Held at 10 Downing Street.” 9 July 1988. The National Archives.
  49. “CAB 128/89/20 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet Held at 10 Downing Street.” 20 October 1988. The National Archives.
  50. “The Boat People.” Daily Mail, 15 October 1988.
  51. “EC/46/SC/CRP.44 Update on Regional Developements in Asia and Oceania.” UNHCR, 19 August 1996. Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee.
  52. “CAB 128/94/16 Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet Held at 10 Downing Street ,» 30 November 1989. The National Archives.
  53. “Howe Spurns Boat People.” The Sunday Times, 3 April 1988.
  54. “Vietnam Refugees Halt Exodus to Hong Kong.” 11 October 1988.
  55. Lipman, Jana K. In camps: Vietnamese refugees, asylum seekers, and repatriates. Critical refugee studies 1. Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2020, p. 161-200.
  56. “USA: No, 10 Record of Conversation (MT, President Bush),” November 24, 1989. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/212283.
  57. Hong Kong, Vietnamese boat people face a harsh future. 1988. UNHCR/Anneliese Hollmann.
  58. https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/consultation-note/.
  59. White house photos: MT visiting Carter at the White House (coffee break). 1979. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109593.
  60. White house photos: MT visiting Bush at Camp David (arriving 1). 1989. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/110722.