CHINA RETALIATES

by PHI-VÂN NGUYEN

December 2019

By 1978, the Soviet Union had become China’s number one enemy. Yet the primary danger did not lie at the border between the two countries. The most immediate threat was on China’s Southern flank. In Beijing’s view, Vietnam had become a satellite of the Soviet Union. Its invasion of Cambodia signaled the beginning of Soviet expansionism into Southeast Asia. How could China retaliate against Vietnam? Beijing launched a two pronged attack against Hanoi: a military invasion and a diplomatic offense. This turned the Third Indochina War from a regional conflict into an international confrontation. 

A Military Invasion

China’s military invasion seemed to be the first reaction to Vietnamese expansionism. Historians have detailed the process.1 The most famous intervention was the military invasion of the Northern highlands in Vietnam in February 1979. Deng Xiaoping first checked with US President Jimmy Carter about an American reaction if Chinese launched an attack against Vietnam during his January visit to the United States.2 Once he got a US assurance that it would not react to a Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Beijing engaged more than half a million combattants into a military campaign on February 17, 1979.3

But the invasion did not last. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army retreated, while causing massive destruction on their way back. By March 16, all troops had left Vietnam. On that day, Deng Xiaoping declared that the military intervention was a complete victory. The intervention helped unite the Chinese population, still divided by the Cultural Revolution. It also contributed to the launch of Deng Xaoping’s Four Modernizations,4 But the intervention had not changed the status quo ante bellum. Vietnam did not withdraw its troops from Cambodia. Hun Sen’s government did not create a coalition government. Nor did Hanoi cancel its alliance with the Soviet Union. 

China did not achieve greater results in its military offensive for several reasons. Its advance into Vietnamese territory was difficult. The steep terrain proved difficult. And Chinese troops were facing a fierce enemy. The Vietnamese army could rely on well-trained soldiers and massive equipment. They would not let the Chinese advance without a fight. China needed more military divisions to make this punitive expedition a success. Yet involving more troops could trigger the Soviet Union’s intervention. Moscow honoured the promise that they would support Vietnam. Politburo members in Soviet Union took measures the day following Chinese invasion. They unanimously voted for a re-deployment of twenty divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, together with a one-month ultimatum to Beijing.5 The Americans provided Beijing with satellite images showing the state of alertness of Soviet troops in Siberia, suggesting that they were not ready to attack China.6 But more Chinese soldiers into Vietnam could also set the Soviet troops into motion. Intensifying or prolonging the military offensive was thus not an option. A limited military campaign failed to end Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. A diplomatic offensive could yield more results.  

Building Regional Support

China knew that it needed outside support to undermine Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. So it approached Southeast Asian countries to make sure they would not recognize Hun Seng’s government. The Chinese reached out to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines in 1978.7 The most strategic ally in this regional policy was Thailand.

Research based on Khmer and Vietnamese archives suggests that even the Khmer Rouge realized Thailand’s strategic importance. They needed to clear the threat from their Western border to focus on its eastern side. Khmer Rouge leaders met with Thai authorities to explain their non belligerent position. Yet it was Chinese pressure in January which convinced Bangkok. The Thais accepted to transport Chinese armament to the Khmer Rouge.8 Thailand was on board. But this did not mean that Thailand felt comfortable doing so. 

Bangkok rejected an open alliance with the Khmer Rouge. It also had to make sure that its service to the Khmer Rouge would not come under international scrutiny. So Thailand had to negotiate a similar agreement with UN agencies. Thai officials insisted on specific conditions when Waldheim came on an official visit. The food provided to the refugee camps had to be purchased in Thailand. And all the transportation of relief goods would be carried out by the Thai army.9

Dodging Responsibility Over the Overseas Chinese

China also needed to clear an important point with Southeast Asian countries. Beijing walked on a thin line about the repatriation of ethnic Chinese. Beijing accused Vietnam of discriminating against ethnic Chinese.10 It contested previous Vietnamese legislation on the nationalization of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Instead, Beijing considered they were Chinese nationals, which required protection. This declaration was a symbolic blow to Hanoi. Yet this proclamation also had an unexpected effect: It generated expectations from Southeast Asian countries bearing the brunt of the refugee crisis.

At the December 1978 Consultation meeting, the Malaysian representative wondered if China was ready to resettle refugees.11 But Beijing refused categorically. Such a move would risk repatriating all persecuted ethnic Chinese across Southeast Asia.12 Overseas Chinese still proved crucial. But Beijing was ready to respect Southeast Asian states’ sovereignty over ethnic Chinese populations while encouraging them to contribute to China’s Four Modernizations.13 To denounce Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia, refugee protection was an interesting avenue. Yet bilateral denunciation or repatriation would prove too risky. Instead, Beijing could join international efforts to protection Southeast Asian refugees. This option would allow China to oppose Vietnam while avoiding repatriations. 

Joining Multilateral Efforts for Refugee Protection

China carried out a diplomatic offensive at the United Nations. Such a campaign would have to compensate for the failure of the military invasion. Washington established commercial relationships in July 1979 as a “reward” for Chinese retaliation.14 But China’s invasion of Vietnam otherwise tarnished its international image. India and several African countries disapproved of what they perceived as a Chinese aggression against Vietnam. Even ASEAN states considered submitting a resolution to the UN Security Council condemning both Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Chinese invasion of Vietnam. They eventually abandoned this initiative when Beijing recalled its troops back to China.15 China’s international popularity was not at its best. So turning the international community against Vietnam was not a mince affair. 

Vietnam had lost much of its international sympathy with its invasion of Cambodia. But it had also become part of the United Nations. Hanoi had overcome the US veto, when, in 1977, it became a member state.16 The General Assembly even agreed to support Vietnam’s reconstruction.17 Vietnam had entered the new field of multi-UN agencies’ cooperation. China would have to work against the tide to turn the United Nations community against Vietnam.

The same day troops withdrew from Vietnam, China faced a serious backlash. On March 16, 1979, the Security Council failed to pass a resolution condemning Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. But this did not mean that the Chinese diplomatic offensive was over. From then on, it relied on the UN Secretary General Kurt Wadlheim to become an ally. The same day Chinese representatives met with Waldheim asked him to use his own personal influence to end Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia.18 The Secretary General’s duty to promote peaceful relationships could work in Beijing’s favor. 

China also multiplied its interventions within UN agencies. Beijing did not embrace refugee protection as a political weapon from the get go. In March 1979, Chinese representatives blamed Vietnam for armed conflicts in Southeast Asia. Beijing also reacted to Laos’ complaint that Chinese troops were posted at the border.19 In April, Chinese attacks only mentioned the question of refugees. This issue was an ancillary problem, compared to border tensions or sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracels islands.20 In June, though, Beijing’s communication strategy changed. States discussed the possibility of holding a conference on the humanitarian crisis. This is when the refugee issue acquired a new significance. 

Beijing made a direct correlation between the refugee crisis and Vietnam’s expansionism. In a statement, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that “the problem of Indo-Chinese refugees has arisen solely as a result of the fact that the Vietnamese Government is pursuing a policy of aggression and war.”21 The following month, China compared Vietnamese authorities to Nazi Germany. A text to be circulated to the General Assembly, denounced Vietnamese expansionism. Vietnam was exporting refugees in a “planned, organized, and systematic way,” recalling “the appalling Hitlerite persecution of the Jews in the 1930s.”22 The connection between the armed conflicts and multilateral efforts to protect refugees was incremental. But Beijing realized this was the best way to denounce Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. So China started to attend the meetings of the UNHCR’s executive committee. China had done little until then, despite being a member since 1972. Using refugee protection to punish Vietnam transformed the Third Indochina War. It allowed a regional conflict to become an international issue. And it shifted Chinese attacks, from a military intervention to a diplomatic offensive.

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References

  1. See Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War After the War. New York: Harcourt Publishing, 1986, Westad, Odd Arne, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds. Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-1979, London: Frank Cass, 2006.
  2. Menétrey-Monchau, Cécile. “The Changing Post-War US Strategy in Indochina,” In The Third Indochina War, Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–1979, edited by Odd Arne Westad, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, 65–86. London: Routledge, 2006; Zhang Xiaoming. Deng Xiaoping’s Long War, The Military Conflict Between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015, p. 60 and following.
  3. Zhang Xiaoming provides the most recent study of the military aspects of the war. Using Chinese sources, he references “nine field armed, three regional divisions, three artillery divisions, two antiaircraft artillery divisions, one rail-road engineering division and five engineering regiments” p. 90, in addition to the ten of thousands of militiamen mobilized in the month preceding the invasion, see  chp.3. On the mobilization of civilians see Zhang Xiaoming, chp.3 and the forthcoming research of Qingfei Yin.
  4. Zhang Xiaoming makes the most compelling case for this argument in Deng Xiaoping’s Long War.
  5. Marangé, Céline. “Les relations politiques de l’Union soviétique avec le Vietnam de 1975 à 1995.” Outre-mers 94, no. 354–355 (2007): 154, Radchenko, Sergey. Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 128.
  6. Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War After the War. New York: Harcourt Publishing, 1986, p. 360. Goscha, Christopher E. Vietnam, a New History. New York: Basic Books, 2016, p. 396.
  7. Qiang Zhai. “Review of Zhang Xiaoming, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.” Hi Diplo Round Table XII, no. 22 (2016): 20.
  8. See Goscha, Christopher E. “Vietnam, the Third Indochina War and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism.” In The Third Indochina War, Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972–1979, edited by Odd Arne Westad, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, 152–86. London: Routledge, 2006, p. 178.
  9. See in document here https://boatpeoplehistory.com/archives-3/kd/kurt-waldheims-visit-to-thailand/.
  10. On this see Woodside, Alexander. “Nationalism and Poverty in the Breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese Relations.” Pacific Affairs 52, no. 3 (1979): 381–409.
  11. See Report of the UNHCR December 1978 Consultation in the Key Documents, paragraph 107.
  12. FRUS 1977–1980 Volume XIII China. “Memorandum of Conversation Between Jimmy Carter, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Their Delegations, 30 January 1979.” 772.
  13. Bolt, Paul. China and Southeast Asia’s Ethnic Chinese: State and Diaspora in Contemporary Asia. Westport: Praeger, 2000.
  14. Qiang Zhai. “Review of Zhang Xiaoming, Deng Xiaoping’s Long War: The Military Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979–1991. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.” H Diplo Round Table XII, no. 22 (2016): 22.
  15. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0901/0002/01. “Confidential, Note for the File, Rafeeudin Ahmed, 5 March 1979.”
  16. The Ford administration had vetoed in July 1975. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 413 in July 1977 eventually accepted Vietnam’s membership.
  17. Assembly, United Nations General. “Resolution 32/3, Assistance for the Reconstruction of Viet Nam, 14 October 1977.” (1977): Accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/32/ares32r3.pdf.
  18. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0987/0008/14. “Notes on a meeting held in the Secretary-General’s office with the Permanent Representative, Counsellor, and First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, 16 March 1979.”
  19. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0901/0005/14. “Communication From the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations to the Permanent Missions of the State Members of the United Nations, 26 March 1979.”
  20. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0901/0005/14. “Speech By the Head of the Chinese Government Delegation At the Second Plenary Meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations, 16 April 1979.”
  21. UN/Kurt Waldheim Files/ S-0901/0005/14. “Statement Dated 16 June 1979 By the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Need to Stop the Vietnamese Authorities From Creating and Exporting Refugees.”
  22. UNHCR/F11/2/39_391_46_CHI, “Speech Made By Han Nianlong, Head of the Chinese Government Delegation and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, At the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Sino-Vietnamese Negotiations on 5 July 1979,” p. 2.